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Abstract 
This PhD thesis features the first three studies on the application of goal setting 
at an airport's security control. Goal setting is one of the most studied areas in work 
and organizational psychology. The first study analyzed if goal setting by supervisors 
can easily and effectively be used to guide work performance of Security Officers at a 
security control. The results of this field study demonstrate that the use of short-term 
goals is practicable even without prior investments such as training of supervisors. 
Furthermore, an effect of goal setting on objective team-level measures of productivity 
could be demonstrated. The second study is a laboratory study that contrasted a dual 
goal for speed and accuracy with a single goal for speed on the same task. As 
performance tasks, the Sternberg paradigm and the d2 test were used. Speed 
measures and errors demonstrated that both dual and single goals increase 
performance by enhancing memory scanning. The single goal triggered a speed-
accuracy trade-off, favoring speed over accuracy, whereas this was not the case with 
the dual goal. In difficult trials, dual goals slowed down scanning processes again so 
that errors could be prevented. The third study analyzed goals on the highest 
hierarchical level, namely organizational level. Using the Productivity Measurement and 
Enhancement System, the relevant organizational objectives, goal domains, as well as 
the key performance indicators of a security control could be identified. The 
operationalizations of the key performance indicators allow for insights into 
measurement practices at a security control. The contingency functions of the system 
allow managers to judge in which domain investments are most promising. 
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Abstract (Deutsch) 
Diese Doktorarbeit beinhaltet die ersten drei Studien, die die Anwendung von 
Zielsetzungen in einer Sicherheitskontrolle an einem Flughafen thematisieren. 
Zielsetzungen sind eines der am meisten untersuchten Gebiete innerhalb der Arbeits- 
und Organisationspsychologie. Die erste Studie untersuchte, ob Zielsetzungen durch 
Vorgesetzte einfach und effektiv verwendet werden können, um die Arbeitsleistung von 
Sicherheitsbeauftragten einer Sicherheitskontrolle zu lenken. Die Resultate dieser 
Feldstudie zeigen, dass Ziele, die eine kurze Zeitspanne betreffen, sogar ohne 
vorgängige Investitionen wie zum Beispiel Schulung der Vorgesetzten praktikabel sind. 
Darüber hinaus konnte ein Effekt der Zielsetzungen auf objektive Produktivitätsmasse 
auf Teamebene gezeigt werden. Die zweite Studie ist eine Laborstudie, welche ein 
Doppelziel für Geschwindigkeit und Genauigkeit mit einem Einfachziel für 
Geschwindigkeit bezüglich derselben Aufgabe verglich. Als Leistungsaufgaben wurden 
das Sternberg-Paradigma und der d2 Test verwendet. Geschwindigkeitsmasse und 
Fehler zeigten auf, dass sowohl Doppel- als auch Einfachziele die Leistung durch 
Verbesserung des Scannings im Gedächtnis erhöhen. Das Einfachziel löste einen 
Geschwindigkeits-Genauigkeits-Austausch aus, wobei Geschwindigkeit gegenüber 
Genauigkeit begünstigt wurde. Mit dem Doppelziel war dies nicht der Fall. In 
schwierigen Experimentaldurchgängen verlangsamten Doppelziele die 
Scanningprozesse wiederum, was die Vermeidung von Fehlern ermöglichte. Die dritte 
Studie analysierte Ziele auf der höchsten Hierarchiestufe, nämlich auf 
Organisationsebene. Durch die Anwendung des Productivity Measurement and 
Enhancement System konnten die relevanten Organisationsziele, Zielbereiche, sowie 
die Leistungsindikatoren einer Sicherheitskontrolle identifiziert werden. Die 
Operationalisierungen der Leistungsindikatoren ermöglichen Einblicke in die 
Leistungsmessung einer Sicherheitskontrolle. Die Kontingenzfunktionen des Systems 
ermöglichen es Managern abzuschätzen, in welchem Bereich Investitionen am 
lohnenswertesten erscheinen. 
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1 General introduction 
1.1 The history of research and development in airport security 
Airport security is a relatively young subject as such, and its history within 
psychology is even shorter. The terror attacks against the United States of America on 
September 11, 2001, can be identified as the major driving force which boosted both 
airport security industry and research. 9/11 as well as later incidents, which received 
broad coverage in mass media, drastically increased both the public and governmental 
interest as well as the perceived need for research in this field. Politicians, government 
authorities, and the general public alike called for more stringent security measures 
that had to be devised and subsequently evaluated. In many cases, those had a 
considerable impact on society. 
For example, the stringent restrictions concerning liquids in cabin baggage1 
(European Commission, 2006) for airline passengers after the 2006 transatlantic 
aircraft plot, where liquid components of explosives were planned to be smuggled on 
board an aircraft (Srinivasan & Prabhakaran, 2009), considerably restricted 
passengers' personal freedom. However, at that time, it was the only possible way of 
mitigating the threat posed by liquid explosives. In everyday practice though, this threat 
mitigation came at a high price. According to the theory of reactance (Brehm, 1966; 
Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Miron & Brehm, 2006), the greater the subjectively perceived 
importance of a restricted personal freedom is, the more reactance the individual will 
show. As drinking is the most important vital requirement for human beings, it is not 
astonishing that reactivity was rather strong. The ensuing problems at airport security 
control ranged from tedious discussions with passengers and innumerable complaints 
to physical attacks on police staff. Apart from the annoyance caused for passengers, 
this new restriction also meant significant additional investments in terms of time and 
                                            
1
 “Cabin baggage” (also known as “carry-on baggage/luggage” or “hand baggage/luggage”) is 
the type of baggage that a passenger is allowed to carry along in the cabin of the aircraft. 
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money, which again stressed the importance of research and development in this field 
in order to alleviate these negative consequences as much as possible. 
There are basically two main areas where investments into research and 
development can be made; namely technology and human factors. In the first years 
after 9/11, measures taken in order to render flying more secure usually consisted of 
large investments into technology. Training and subsequent use of the human 
capabilities of Security Officers (SOs) were of secondary importance. Still today, some 
authors stress the importance of new technology as an area of potential improvement 
(e.g., Seidenstat, 2009). As one of the first researchers worldwide, Adrian Schwaninger 
realized this disequilibrium of technology and the human factor. In order to make the 
human potential accessible, he (Schwaninger, 2005) combined signal detection and 
object recognition theories, which led to the development of a pre-employment 
assessment test for x-ray screeners (x-ray object recognition test ORT, Hardmeier, 
Hofer, & Schwaninger, 2005), computer-based training for x-ray image interpretation 
(X-Ray Tutor, Schwaninger, 2003, 2004), as well as the x-ray competency assessment 
test (X-Ray CAT, Koller & Schwaninger, 2006). 
In the following years, many studies validated the existing approaches, as well 
as broadened and extended the available knowledge in these domains. Interestingly, 
there are only a few studies available from abroad: McCarley, Kramer, Wickens, 
Vidoni, and Boot (2004) contributed significantly to the development of x-ray screener 
training. Meneer, Barrett, Phillips, Donnelly, and Cave (2007) investigated in more 
detail what happens if two targets have to be identified simultaneously in an image. 
Most studies, however, were carried out by the Schwaninger group. They further 
investigated which factors influence detection performance in x-ray screening and their 
relative importance (Bolfing, Halbherr, & Schwaninger, 2008), identified how the 
relation of search time and non-search time in x-ray baggage inspection changes with 
training using the two-component inspection model (Koller, Drury, & Schwaninger, 
[1] General introduction 
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2009; Wales, Anderson, Jones, Schwaninger, & Horne, 2009), and compared three 
different computer-based training systems (Koller, Hardmeier, Michel, & Schwaninger, 
2008). 
Once pre-employment assessment, computer-based training, and competency 
assessment for x-ray screeners had been established, it became evident that 
performance in training and testing sessions is not necessarily equivalent to everyday 
performance at the security control lane. Imagine a SO who is perfectly trained and 
able to detect prohibited items in cabin baggage. If this SO is, for whatever reason, 
inattentive at work, his performance on the job is likely to be much worse than his 
performance in training and testing sessions. These thoughts encouraged researchers 
and the industry alike to think about ways of measuring on the job performance of SOs. 
The first approach in that domain was realized by Hofer and Schwaninger (2005) who 
studied data from Threat Image Projection (TIP) in cabin baggage screening. 
TIP is a software function of x-ray devices that presents threat images to SOs 
during work. Threat images are shown with a preset overall frequency and appear at 
random intervals. The first goal of TIP is to keep SOs’ alertness at a high level during 
work. Without TIP, the usually extremely low prevalence of threat objects encountered 
by SOs during their daily work can be regarded as a danger to their alertness. Because 
SOs working without TIP would experience again and again that threats object are 
extremely rare, their criterion of decision might tend to become more liberal (Wolfe et 
al., 2007). The second goal of TIP is to allow for measuring on the job performance of 
x-ray screeners by logging SOs reactions to threat images. Carrying out research with 
TIP data, however, is somewhat delicate since those data are security sensitive 
information. Nevertheless, ways have been found to continue research in that domain. 
The study by Schwaninger, Hofer, and Wetter (2007) evaluated the adaptive 
computer-based training system X-Ray Tutor using TIP data. This study allowed for a 
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validation of previous results. Moreover, it examined training and TIP in hold baggage2 
screening (Shanks & Bradley, 2004) more closely, which differs from cabin baggage 
screening in several points. Hold baggage is larger in size, often packed in a much 
more complex way than cabin baggage, and the list of prohibited items differs from 
cabin baggage. Furthermore, x-ray systems for hold baggage are different from x-ray 
systems for cabin baggage: for instance, they feature automatic explosives detection 
and generate images from multiple viewpoints. TIP has different properties in hold 
baggage screening as well: In hold baggage screening, so-called “combined 
threat/non-threat images” (CTIs/CNTIs) are used, which are previously assembled 
images, either with or without a threat, that are taken from an image library and 
inserted in between real passenger bag images. In cabin baggage screening, however, 
so-called “fictional threat items” (FTIs), that are taken from an image library, are 
inserted on the spot into x-ray images of real passenger bags. 
 
1.2 The “embedded applied research and development” paradigm 
Up to 2007, sophisticated machines and proven ways of training x-ray image 
interpretation of SOs had been developed. All of this work could be done in the 
university setting by analyzing automatically generated data. In the same year, the new 
head of the security control branch of the Kantonspolizei Zürich (Zurich State Police) 
realized that he had to have a research and development team inside the organization 
in order to advance the field any further. In 2008, he formed this team and, together 
with them, created a research setting that he called “embedded applied research and 
development”. This term signifies that a group of researchers actually works within the 
organization and is part of it. This paradigm offers the advantage of the researchers 
being able to have deep insights into the organization and the challenges it faces. The 
                                            
2
 “Hold baggage” (also known as “checked baggage”) is the type of baggage that a passenger 
hands over to staff at check-in, which is then transported in the hold of the aircraft. 
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researchers spend a considerable amount of time learning about the organization and 
getting to know the workforce of the organization. 
The result of the first insights gained with this new paradigm were that it was 
realized that x-ray screening with training and TIP applications represents just one part 
of the SOs' work. On being able to scrutinize the daily process at a security control, it 
became evident that there are in fact many more duties and tasks to be carried out 
reliably and efficiently. In order to provide a high security standard, not only cabin and 
hold baggage have to be scrutinized but also the passengers themselves. It became 
clear that a holistic approach would be needed. A holistic approach tries to account for 
the whole final product, and security control is seen as composed of several different 
elements that altogether contribute to this final product. Among these elements are 
processes like x-ray screening, correct operation and interpretation of the hand-held 
metal detector and the walk-through metal detector3, use of trace detection equipment4, 
pat-down search5, manual baggage search, and correct reaction and communication in 
case of an alarm. 
In order to measure performance of a security control in a more holistic way, the 
method of covert testing was at hand. Wetter, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2008)6 defined 
covert testing as “a method of testing the security control’s ability to detect threat 
objects carried by a tester in a situation of high ecological validity” (p. 358). Covert tests 
had already been used on a case-by-case basis by regulatory authorities for quality 
control purposes. In the mentioned publication, the method of covert testing was 
studied in more detail. This study is, to our knowledge, the first published study 
                                            
3
 Both hand-held and walk-through metal detectors are used to detect metallic objects on a 
person which are not allowed in the cabin of the aircraft. 
4
 Trace detection equipment is used for detecting traces of explosive and/or inflammable 
substances in baggage and on passengers. 
5
 “Pat-down search” refers to the manual inspection of a passenger in order to check if items are 
carried on the body or in garments that are not allowed in the cabin of the aircraft. 
6
 This work was conducted during the time of my PhD studies. It can be seen as a preliminary 
study investigating more closely one method of performance measurement. The results of this 
study and the knowledge gained on covert tests served as a basis for definition and 
measurement of indicator 3.1 of our ProMES system (see chapter 4.4.B). 
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worldwide on covert testing. It turned out that frequent covert tests are not only an 
instrument for assessing performance and vulnerabilities in a holistic way, they can 
also be used to train and motivate SOs, which is particularly important since the base 
rate of people carrying forbidden items is, luckily, very low in everyday practice. With 
this study, the “embedded applied research and development” team was able to make 
its first contribution to broadening the horizon of research in airport security by making 
use of their in-depth knowledge of security control operation. 
In the following year, two more studies were published. One of them (Hofer, 
Wetter, Graf, Guo, & Schwaninger, 20097) was conducted in collaboration with the 
Schwaninger group. This study extended the present knowledge on training by 
analyzing learning content management systems (a form of e-learning) as a means for 
(re-)training and communication in the security domain. The second study (Wetter, 
Laube, & Hofer, 20097) consists of a comparison between two different leadership 
structures for security control lanes. It compares the traditional structure to a new 
structure, which had been devised by a practitioner with many years of experience in 
the field. To our knowledge, this study is the first worldwide that focused on leadership 
and organizational structures in the security control domain. With this study, the 
domain of work and organizational psychology was opened in airport security research. 
Both the first and the second study, given in full text later in this PhD thesis (see 
chapters 2 and 3), can be seen as a continuation of that work. 
Providing security is certainly the main task of a security control. However, there 
are other aspects that are important as well. Wetter, Lipphardt, and Hofer (2010)8 
stated that “the ideal security control would be effective, cheap, and would not interfere 
with the operation of the airport” (p. 301). These aspects open an interdisciplinary field, 
which can only successfully be studied if psychologists, engineers, managers, and 
                                            
7
 This work was also conducted during the time of my PhD studies. 
8
 This work was also conducted during the time of my PhD studies. It is a preliminary study to 
the first and the third study given in full text in this PhD thesis (see chapters 2 and 4). 
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security personnel work together and share their individual knowledge. In order to do 
so, an interdisciplinary working group at Zurich Airport was founded in 2009, which was 
jointly led by the police’s research & development team and by a management 
representative of Zurich Airport’s Terminal Engineering. Participating members from 
the police were the head of passenger control and one of his supervisors, the head of 
instruction and support, technical staff, the process owner, a project leader, as well as 
an employee representation. Participating members from Zurich Airport were a 
representative of Airport Security and the head of electronic support. On a case by 
case basis, further staff or management representatives were invited to participate. The 
group reported to a steering committee of airport and police managers. 
To be able to more closely examine the aspects mentioned in the above 
paragraph, new ways of measurement had to be defined. Some of these concepts 
(e.g., throughput) had been known for some time already in benchmarking between 
airports. They are of particular importance for airport terminal capacity planning (Solak, 
Clarke, & Johnson, 2009). For in-depth study of the security control process, it was 
necessary to more clearly define and operationalize these measures. The study by 
Wetter et al. (2010) took that up and proposed definitions and operationalizations of 
throughput and passenger density. It furthermore specified two different ways of 
measurement for throughput and also a different method to determine passenger 
density. Additionally, the study suggested a classification of the influences on the 
security control process into external and internal factors. By the means of exploratory 
field work, it estimated the influence of some prominent external and internal factors on 
objective and subjective dependent variables, covering the domains of efficiency, 
security, and employee work strain. 
 
1.3 The three “goal setting” studies 
In chapters two to four, three studies are given in full text, which represent the 
continuation of the line of research mentioned above. These three studies have in 
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common that they are all about goal setting, a well-established subject in work and 
organizational psychology, which harbors an abundance of findings and studies (e.g., 
Locke & Latham, 2002). The goal of this PhD thesis is to prepare the grounds for 
applications of goal setting in security related domains, which pose their own specific 
demands. Furthermore, the effects to be expected by applying goal setting in security 
related domains shall be analyzed. The scope of the studies becomes broader and 
more integral from the first to the third, and the picture conveyed more holistic. 
The first study (Wetter, Hofer, & Jonas, submitted) has its starting point at the 
very front: It is a field study that analyzes if goal setting is a practicable way of 
influencing work performance of SOs by their supervisors. The study is set at an 
airport's security control and is thus of the highest possible ecological validity. The 
baseline condition in this study is work without daily goals, i.e., the status quo. As 
previously used in many goal setting studies, two different goals, namely a “do your 
best” and a “specific difficult” goal, were used as experimental conditions. With this 
study, it is demonstrated that daily goal setting is practicable and does indeed make a 
difference regarding work performance in the security domain. These first positive 
results are the basis for the two subsequent studies. 
During data collection for the first study, some employees voiced their concern 
about goal setting as we tested it. They argued that speed goals would lead to a 
decrease in performance in another aspect of their work (e.g., provided security level). 
In other words, they suggested that trade-offs show up if goals make one focus on one 
single aspect. These concerns were taken into account, which led us to think about 
dual and even multiple goals. Would it be possible to tackle several important aspects 
of one’s work with multiple goals? As a result of these considerations, the second study 
(Wetter, Wegge, Jonas, & Schmidt, submitted) was designed. It is a laboratory study 
that investigates the effects of single and dual goals on speed and performance 
measures. It is guided by the research questions if dual goals are effective, and, if yes, 
[1] General introduction 
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if they have the potential to reduce speed-accuracy trade-offs. The laboratory setting 
was chosen in order to have as much standardization as possible for investigation of 
these theoretical issues, as well as not to risk any speed-accuracy trade-off in the real 
setting at the security control. 
Thinking about dual or even multiple goals inevitably leads to the question of 
what the different goals of the organization actually are. This is the main research 
question for the third study (Wetter, Fuhrmann, Lipphardt, & Hofer, 2011). It draws 
upon the knowledge gained in the two preceding studies. By providing the big picture, 
the subject is wrapped up: The third study identifies goals on the highest hierarchical 
level in the organization. It demonstrates that, in a complex work domain like an airport, 
all stakeholders have to work together in order to achieve the best possible result. As 
can be inferred by the results of the second study, a maximization of performance in 
every single key performance indicator of the organizational goals is unlikely to be 
possible due to capacity limits in the human workforce, equipment, as well as in time 
and resources. Therefore, an optimization has to be sought for. In order to reach the 
most useful optimization, management level representatives of the two main 
stakeholders at airport security control set up a Productivity Measurement and 
Enhancement System (ProMES, Pritchard, 1990) on management level, which 
specifies clear contingency functions between key performance indicator values and 
productivity scores. This system provides clear answers if decisions for optimization in 
one or the other goal domain have to be made. It specifies which key performance 
indicator in which goal domain has the most potential productivity benefit at that 
moment if an investment is to be made. 
As all three studies are subsequently given in their original text and style, they 
differ from each other. The first and the second study adhere to the writing standard of 
the APA (American Psychological Association), as they are submitted to journals that 
apply the APA standard. The third study, however, adheres to the writing standard of 
the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), as it was published in a 
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publication of the IEEE. The IEEE is “the world’s largest professional association for 
the advancement of technology” (IEEE, 2011). 
 
1.4 Theoretical foundation of the three studies 
1.4.A Goal setting and the High Performance Cycle9 
One of the very basic questions in management is how to tell employees what 
their job consists of and what they are expected to do. On explaining a job profile to 
subordinates, managers specify tasks to be carried out that should lead to the 
attainment of certain objectives. In the course of the last century and with the progress 
in technology, jobs became increasingly complex. It is not astonishing therefore, that 
optimal ways of communication about duties and expectations at work have been 
sought for. Goal setting theory specifies in particular, how leaders can effectively 
communicate their expectations as goals to their subordinates by showing how goals 
affect performance. The theory further suggests mechanisms by which goals exert their 
effect, and it specifies mediators and moderators of this process. 
The so-called “High Performance Cycle” (Figure 1, see next page) is a 
framework that explains motivation in the workplace (Latham & Locke, 2007). It is 
based on the findings of a wide body of studies on goal setting and provides a basis for 
making interventions. It explains the regulatory cycle that is a complex interplay of 
various components. The demands include the goal, which shapes subsequent 
actions. The actions themselves and their result are influenced by moderators and 
conveyed by mediators. Contingent rewards lead to satisfaction, which again enhances 
commitment to the organization. To close the cycle, it is postulated that high 
commitment and willingness to accept future challenges leads to subsequent 
acceptance of new, challenging, high goals, as well as a high self-efficacy. 
                                            
9
 As goal setting is one of the most researched subjects in work and organizational psychology 
with an abundance of studies and publications, only a short and incomplete introduction can be 
given here. 
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Figure 1. The High Performance Cycle (from Latham & Locke, 2007). 
 
The core of the goal setting theory focuses on the properties of an effective 
goal, which are goal difficulty and specificity, goal level, content of goals, mediators and 
moderators, and goal source (Locke & Latham, 2002). As these properties are among 
the most important tenets of goal setting theory, they shall be defined and discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 
It is proven by many studies that goals that are both specific and difficult lead to 
better performance than unspecific or easy goals, and can thus be regarded as 
optimal. Easy goals do not trigger much motivation and effort. Unspecific goals (e.g., 
“do your best”) lead to a great variance in performance. Because they lack an external 
referent, they can be defined idiosyncratically (Locke & Latham, 2002). They can thus 
be regarded as being shaped by the person’s motivation and aspiration levels. 
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“Goal level” refers to the different hierarchical levels on which goals can be set. 
These range from goals for individuals, which have been researched most, to group 
and organizational goals, which have moved into the focus of research rather recently. 
In groups and organizations, the beneficial effects of specific difficult goals can also be 
observed (Locke & Latham, 1990; Kleingeld, van Mierlo, & Arends, 2011; Widmeyer & 
Ducharme, 1997). Inside one organization, the picture gets somewhat more complex, 
though, since individual and group/organizational goals do not necessarily have to 
match. This can lead to open or hidden goal conflicts. The diagnosis, alignment and 
management of organizational, group, and individual goals can be seen as one of the 
major challenges for managers in organizations. 
The content of the goals can either focus on performance or on learning. A 
performance goal consists of a certain level to be attained on a performance 
measurement indicator (e.g., to produce 100 pieces per hour). A learning goal refers to 
the number of different strategies, ideas, or problem-solving activities that are 
developed for a given task. Learning goals can be especially fruitful when people are 
confronted with a very difficult and complex task (Winters & Latham, 1996). The focus 
then lies on the process of working on the problem and learning by doing so rather than 
on the final outcome. 
Up to the present, many mediators and moderators of the effects of goal setting 
have been identified. Probably the most important and obvious moderator is goal 
commitment. If people are not committed to a goal, there will be no or only small effects 
of goal setting (Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck, & Alge, 1999; Seijts & Latham, 2000). Goal 
commitment is high if the goal is subjectively perceived as important and if self-efficacy, 
i.e., the belief that the goal can be attained, is high (Locke & Latham, 2002). Task 
complexity is a second moderator of the effects of goal setting: With tasks of lower 
complexity, the effects of goal setting are higher than with tasks of high complexity 
(Wood, Mento, & Locke, 1987). Feedback, which will be discussed in chapter 1.4.C, 
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can be considered as another important moderator of goal commitment. The four main 
mediators of the effects of goal setting on performance, namely effort, persistence, 
attention, and task strategies, will be introduced in chapter 3.1. 
Last but not least, the goal source can differ as goals can be self-set, 
participatively set, or assigned. It could be assumed that participatively set goals have 
a general advantage over assigned goals because participatively set goals might have 
a higher subjective importance for employees. However, the empirical evidence on this 
question turned out to be controversial. Locke and Latham (2002) cite several studies 
by the Latham group which showed that the results reached with participatively set and 
assigned goals did not differ. On the other hand, the Erez group reached the opposite 
conclusion. Given these controversial results, both groups decided to design a study 
together. This approach revealed that it is important that the goal makes sense for the 
employee (i.e., its purpose or rationale is sensible) in order to be effective, whereas 
performance will be lower if a goal is assigned and enforced without explanation 
(Latham, Erez, & Locke, 1988). The former dispute and later collaboration between 
Latham and Erez underpin the importance of participation as a concept within goal 
setting, decision-making, and management in general. 
 
1.4.B Participation 
Participation is a concept that exists in many different fields of research with 
different meanings (Wegge, 2004). However, many definitions have in common that 
participation implies that there is shared decision making, that employees contribute 
according to their competence and not necessarily according to their position, and that 
communication channels are open in all directions (Mitchell, 1973). Participation is an 
important concept because it has been shown to have positive effects on emotions 
(satisfaction) and motivation of employees (upper part of Figure 2, see next page), as 
well as beneficial cognitive effects in decision-making (lower part of Figure 2, see next 
page), which contribute to better performance or productivity (Miller & Monge, 1986). 
[1] General introduction 
 
14 
P
A
R
T
I
C
I
P
A
T
I
O
N
h
i
g
h
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
high satisfaction
and good morale
(trust)
better
decision-making
and coordination by
intelligent utilization
of human resources
less resistance to 
change and high
goal commitment
(work motivation)
high satisfaction
and good morale
 
Figure 2. Positive effects of participation on performance and employee satisfaction 
(translated from Wegge, 2004). 
 
The positive effects of participation on emotions (satisfaction) and motivation of 
employees, independent of later performance, can be explained by several 
mechanisms. Participation helps to satisfy human desires of self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1977, 1997) and self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 2002). Moreover, participation helps 
fulfilling human needs of power, achievement, and affiliation (McClelland, 1987). It can 
also be assumed that autocratic decisions of managers trigger reactance, which leads 
to a decrease of positive emotions such as satisfaction or trust (e.g., Sagie, Elizur, & 
Koslowsky, 1995). By granting participation to subordinates, the negative effects of 
reactance can be reduced (Ashforth & Sacks, 2000). Last but not least, participation 
has been shown to also increase goal commitment since the process of taking part in 
decision-making increases one’s feeling of liability (Erez, Earley, & Hulin, 1985; Klein et 
al., 1999). 
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Regarding beneficial cognitive effects of participation in decision-making, it 
could be shown that intelligent sharing of knowledge and information between 
subordinates and managers leads to better performance (Scully, Kirkpatrick, & Locke, 
1995). Managers have to guide the process of information sharing so that they get the 
relevant information without too much irrelevant or even misleading information. 
Further beneficial cognitive effects revolve around role clarity. Schuler (1980) 
postulated that participation leads to less role conflicts at work, which again entails an 
increase in satisfaction. Smith and Brannick (1990) confirmed Schuler's model 
empirically and found an additional direct influence of participation on satisfaction apart 
from the indirect one that had been postulated by Schuler. It is noteworthy, though, that 
in routine tasks such as carrying out security control, there is presumably not much role 
ambiguity to be found, so the main cognitive advantages of participation might lie in the 
sharing of information, knowledge, and experience. 
Encouraging and engaging in participation can be beneficial for both managers 
and subordinates. By granting participation to subordinates, managers have a means 
of motivating them, increasing their goal commitment, as well as reaching better 
performance outcomes and better decisions. Subordinates can fulfill some of their 
needs and desires and can, at least partly, shape their own work. It is important, 
however, that granted participation also really gives subordinates a chance for 
participating. “Rhetorical” participation, where subordinates are invited to participate but 
in the end have no influence at all, will not lead to the postulated beneficial effects. 
Unfortunately, real, honest participation that is also perceived as such and entails the 
beneficial effects seems to be rather rare (e.g., Harley, 1999). 
 
1.4.C ProMES and feedback 
A systematic approach for setting up a management system is ProMES 
(Pritchard, 1990). The key to its success is the combination of the beneficial effects of 
goal setting, participation and empowerment, as well as feedback, which renders it 
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particularly powerful. The effectiveness of ProMES has been proven in many different 
fields (Pritchard, Harrell, DiazGranados, & Guzman, 2008). Of particular importance for 
this thesis is certainly the successful application of ProMES in a Swedish traffic police 
unit (Pritchard, Culbertson, Malm, & Agrell, 2009). One of the keys to the success of 
ProMES might be its theoretical foundation, which lies in the motivational theory of 
Naylor, Pritchard, and Ilgen (1980). 
 
Energy Pool Motivation Process Needs
Actions Results Evaluations Outcomes Need
satisfaction
 
Figure 3. The expanded motivation model (Pritchard & Ashwood, 2008). 
 
The expanded motivation model (Figure 3) states that, on the one hand, there is 
a pool of physical, mental, and emotional resources (“energy pool”) in every person. On 
the other hand, there are the needs of a person, which are understood in a very broad 
sense and can include the needs mentioned in chapter 1.4.B. The process of 
motivation is seen as the expectation of being able to satisfy one’s needs by applying 
resources (energy) to certain actions. Actions generate results that are evaluated 
subsequently, either by oneself or by another person (e.g., a supervisor). The 
outcomes can be described as what the person gets back after the results have been 
evaluated. Depending on what the outcomes consist of, they have more or less 
potential to satisfy the person’s needs. 
One of the core tenets of this expectancy-value theory is that the strength of the 
connections of the components of the motivation process determines the amount of 
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motivation. For example, if actions do not lead to the desired results, the individual’s 
motivation to do the same action will be lower next time and different actions might be 
chosen to reach the desired results; or if the outcomes do not satisfy the individual’s 
needs, the motivation to strive for the same outcomes will be lower next time. Pritchard 
and Ashwood (2008) state that “for motivation to be high, all the components of the 
model must be high” [p. 37]. 
ProMES can be seen as a system that strives to positively influence the results, 
evaluations, and outcomes of the motivation process, as well as their connections. A 
ProMES system specifies and clarifies which results will be looked at and evaluated 
subsequently by defining goal domains and objectives. Contingency functions clearly 
specify how results will be evaluated. By comparing the contingency functions of the 
different indicators, their relative importance is given. It becomes visible how the 
evaluation of a single result (productivity score of an indicator) will contribute to the 
overall outcome for the company (total productivity). In some cases, ProMES was 
successfully coupled with a reward system that clearly specified the outcome (reward) 
for the evaluations and let employees benefit from the organization’s success. 
In order to reach strong motivational effects, it does not suffice that the 
components are “high” (i.e., in favorable condition) and that the connections between 
them are strong. In addition, the outcomes have to appear useful to the employees for 
satisfying their needs. The actual process of satisfying employee needs with the 
outcomes (e.g., money) is a process that is controlled by the employees themselves. If 
the motivational chain specified above is clear, understandable, and plausible to 
employees, their motivation will be high. This will make them choose actions and, 
subsequently, coordinate and optimize them in a way that optimal outcomes can be 
reached. 
ProMES incorporates regular, fair, and objective feedback. On the one hand, 
this serves as a source of information helping employees to adapt their actions in a 
way that an optimization “from within” can take place. For example, if employees do 
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something differently, they can check in the next performance feedback report if that 
change was beneficial to the result or not. Beneficial changes can be kept and 
reinforced, whereas changes that are detrimental to the result can quickly be given up. 
Moreover, feedback is motivating by allowing for controlling and adjusting of effort, 
intentions, and alertness by set-actual comparison (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). 
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Abstract 
Purpose – This field study investigates the practicability and the effectiveness of 
minimalistic goal setting prior to short interventions on crew performance. It builds a 
bridge from goal setting theory to practice and prepares the grounds for its application 
in security or emergency services. 
Design – Supervisors of Security Officers at a large European airport communicated 
goals (no goal, “do your best,” “specific difficult goal”) without any prior intervention or 
training to their subordinates. Goals were applied to the “peak hour” only, that is, a 
short time span of about 40 minutes. Dependent variables were objective measures of 
efficiency, namely passenger density and throughput, which are true team-level 
measures, as well as questionnaire measures. 
Findings – Goal setting can be used easily and effectively by supervisors to increase 
subordinates’ team performance during short interventions. Supervisors could apply 
goal setting without prior training. Goal setting for short time spans is effective even 
without providing feedback. 
                                            
1
 This study is submitted to the Journal of Business and Psychology. 
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Implications – Pre-intervention goal setting is recommended to be installed as a 
meaningful complement to programs such as “management by objectives”, which focus 
on longer time periods. 
Originality – This is the first study to investigate effects of goal setting by supervisors 
without any prior instruction, training, or other interventions. It is equally the first study 
to analyze effects of short-term goal setting on crew performance in aviation security. In 
particular, goal setting for a defined short period is studied, allowing for an evaluation of 
the effectiveness of only the first part of the goal setting process, i.e., without feedback 
loops.
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2.1 Introduction 
Productivity is becoming more and more important in various economic sectors. 
One main area experiencing huge economic growth is aviation. In just the last five 
years (2004-2009), commercial aviation in Switzerland has experienced more than 
23% increase in the number of departing passengers (Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 
2010). One main bottleneck within an airport is the security control process. Because 
many security checkpoints were planned and constructed based on smaller passenger 
numbers, the security control process has now become a challenge. Many European 
airports do not have enough space to physically enlarge the security checkpoints. 
Therefore, alternative ways have to be found to increase productivity of security 
controls. 
One possible way is the optimization of leadership. Numerous studies 
demonstrated an impact of leadership on subordinates’ performance–for example, in 
teams and crews (e.g., Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Zaccaro, Rittman, & Marks, 2001). 
Optimizing leadership thus promises to be both an effective and cost-saving solution to 
increase performance of the human workforce. It was decided to open a new focus on 
productivity of security controls in this study due to the abundance of research that had 
analyzed performance regarding threat detection only (e.g., Basner et al., 2008; 
Schwaninger, Hardmeier, Riegelnig, & Martin, 2010; Van Wert, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 
2009; Wales, Anderson, Jones, Schwaninger, & Horne, 2009). Moreover, Wetter, 
Fuhrmann, Lipphardt, and Hofer (2011) stated that the objectives of the security control 
at the respective airport, as defined by the management, contain two most important 
indicators that are of equal importance. 
Leaders can set goals for their subordinates and thus influence the way they 
work and perform. In organizations, “management by objectives” (e.g., Drucker, 1974, 
2007; Kopelman, 1986; Odiorne, 1978) has become popular. Following this method, 
goals are set for a predefined specific time period, which is usually 6-12 months. 
During this period, goals are in place, the employee works with them, and data are 
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collected. After this time period, goal progress is evaluated together with the 
supervisor, and, subsequently, a new goal is set for the next time period. In the present 
study, we argue that setting goals for short time periods (e.g., for an intervention that 
lasts 1 hr) can be a way of positively influencing subordinates’ work performance that is 
both effective and cost-efficient. Intelligent goal setting thus presents itself as one of 
the ideal solutions for optimizing or increasing performance during short interventions 
that are common for example in emergency services. 
Several aspects are inherent to goals, such as goal difficulty or specificity. Goal 
setting theory by Locke and Latham (1990, 2002) outlines different aspects that 
characterize effective goals. One of the theory’s most important tenets is that specific, 
difficult goals lead to better performance than generalized “do your best” goals (Locke 
& Latham, 1990). Already in the 1970s there were sufficient field studies available for 
Latham and Yukl (1975) to review. Today, a large body of research documents 
different aspects and effects of goal setting in the laboratory and the field. Locke and 
Latham (2006) summarized some of the most important newer developments, some of 
which are group goal setting (e.g., Haslam, Wegge, & Postmes, 2009), nonconscious 
goals (e.g., Eitam, Hassin, & Schul, 2008), and applications in other disciplines such as 
medicine (e.g., Bradley, Bogardus Jr., Tinetti, & Inouye, 1999) or sports (e.g., Kingston 
& Wilson, 2009). 
We would like to suggest that research on goal setting can be divided into two 
categories: First, there are laboratory studies that typically examined the effects of 
setting a goal that is valid for a short time period only, as laboratory experiments 
typically last less than one hour. This kind of goal setting will subsequently be called 
“short-term”. Short-term goal setting in laboratory studies typically involved time frames 
of minutes to hours. Examples of studies using a short-term time span are Locke 
(1982), with a time frame of 1 min, and Terborg and Miller (1978), with a time frame of 
2 hr. Second, there are applied studies, in which goals were set and in place during 
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periods of time that were much longer. This kind of goal setting will subsequently be 
called “long-term”. Examples of applied studies using this long-term time span range 
from Latham and Kinne (1974), where goals remained in effect at least for the existing 
day, to Ivancevich and McMahon (1982) or Buller and Bell Jr. (1986), where a goal was 
set and remained valid for a period of three months. 
This is where the present study ties in and tries to close three gaps. First, it 
examines the effects of short-term goal setting in the field by explicitly setting a goal 
that is valid for a defined short period only (about 40 min). Our design allows for an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of only the first part of the common goal setting process, 
i.e., goal setting and first performance by the employee, without feedback and 
subsequent adjustment of behavior by the employee or even multiple feedback loops. 
Second, to our knowledge, there is as yet no field study that examined the effects of 
minimalistic goal setting by supervisors, meaning without any instruction, training, or 
other interventions that cost time and money. Third, this is the first study to analyze 
effects of short-term goal setting on crew performance and way of working in aviation 
security. To this end, crew performance in terms of efficiency was measured using two 
true crew-level measures, namely, passenger density and throughput in security 
control lanes. Further, aspects of employees’ cognitive representations of goals and 
their effects are analyzed and discussed. 
 
2.2 Method 
2.2.A Setting and Participants 
This study was conducted at the security control of a large European airport that 
serves as an airline hub. Data were collected from early February to mid March 2010 
(six weeks). To ensure highest possible standardization, data collection took place 
always on the same days (Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday) during the morning peak 
hour between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m. A total of six security control screening lanes, i.e., all 
lanes for passengers with class code “Y” (economy) in the most important sector at the 
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airport, were studied. The lanes all featured the same equipment, including a Smiths 
Heimann Hi-Scan 6046si X-ray device and a Ceia 02PN20 walk-through metal detector 
(WTMD). The layout of the six lanes was very similar but not identical due to 
constructional constraints. 
The security control process basically requires the passenger to put baggage 
and belongings on the roller table, pass the WTMD, and collect baggage and 
belongings again after X-ray inspection. The security control is carried out by Security 
Officers (SOs) between 20 and 65 years of age, that are employed by a governmental 
organization. Although SOs are not police officers, the working environment is 
embedded in police structures and is thus in some respects comparable to police work. 
All SOs and supervisors are trained and certified according to the actual standards by 
the country’s regulatory authority. SOs have no fixed shift schedule, so crews consist of 
five different employees every day2. Crew composition is ad hoc, changes on a daily 
basis, and is random with the exception that some criteria have to be followed (e.g., 
both sexes have to be represented in a crew). Allocation of crews to the studied sector 
was fully random. As a consequence, crews were randomly assigned to the three 
different experimental conditions (see paragraph on variables below). 
Each crew operates one screening lane and consists of four SOs and one crew 
leader, who is in charge of the crew. In the sector of the airport where this study was 
conducted, two supervisors are responsible for controlling and problem solving and 
have higher decision making authority. One of them is responsible for holding pre-shift 
briefings. This study was conducted during standard daily operation in order to ensure 
maximal ecological validity. Accordingly, we did not change the shift plans. Due to that, 
some SOs were present at more than one condition in the study, but crews were never 
the same at different measurements. 
                                            
2
 One day during the measurements, there was a shortage of personnel. Due to that, a crew 
was formed consisting of 3 SOs plus a supervisor, who performed the duties of an SO. 
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2.2.B Variables 
The study featured one independent variable, namely, goal setting, with three 
different conditions: one baseline and two experimental conditions, which we labeled 
“do your best” and “specific difficult goal.” In the baseline condition, no intervention was 
made and no goal communicated to the SOs. This condition reflects standard daily 
operation with the only exception that two observers were present behind the six 
screening lanes (which was the same in all three conditions). The “do your best” 
condition used a classical “do your best” goal as the intervention. Prior to the shift, staff 
from the organization’s research & development (R&D) unit contacted the supervisor in 
charge of the pre-shift briefing for the crews that were studied subsequently. The 
supervisor was given a memo stating the following: “This morning it is our goal that 
everybody does their best in order to achieve excellent job performance” (here freely 
translated from the German). The supervisor was asked to communicate this 
information to the crews at the end of the pre-shift briefing.  
The “specific difficult goal” condition used a specific, difficult goal as the 
intervention. The supervisor was given a memo stating the following: “In today’s 
morning peak, in addition to the compliance with security regulations as usual, it is our 
goal to ensure that there are always 8 passengers simultaneously in a screening lane. 
We, as members of the present shift, can occasionally monitor that ourselves” (freely 
translated here). In other words, crews were told that they can monitor their own goal 
attainment to a certain extent, if they like. Again, the supervisor was asked to 
communicate this instruction to the crews at the end of the pre-shift briefing. This goal 
was chosen because passenger density is important (see paragraph on passenger 
density below), because it is specific (it contains a number), and because it is known to 
be difficult but realistic based on a preliminary study by Wetter, Lipphardt, and Hofer 
(2010). This preliminary study demonstrated that, given this particular airport’s 
infrastructure, this number is usually lower (around 6), but can reach 8 passengers if 
crews are motivated and work together well. To avoid spillover effects from the specific 
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condition to the more unspecific conditions, it was decided to first carry out all baseline 
measurements, then all measurements with the “do your best” goal, and, finally, all 
measurements with the specific difficult goal; all within six weeks. 
Crew performance was assessed in terms of efficiency. Two important 
efficiency measures were recorded, namely passenger density and throughput. 
Passenger density is a measure of the degree of infrastructure capacity utilization. It is 
receiving more and more attention in the applied field, since it denotes how well the 
space of a given security control infrastructure is actually used. As every m2 in an 
airport is very costly, security control would ideally be limited to as many m2 as 
necessary, with as little “empty” or unused area inside as possible. In a given 
infrastructure, higher passenger density indicates that less space is occupied per 
passenger, i.e., that the available space is better utilized. Further, this measure is 
interesting, because it can be controlled by the SOs themselves via the way they work 
and guide passengers. Lower than optimal passenger density would be considered as 
“wasting space” and economically inefficient, whereas higher than optimal passenger 
density could lead to disorderly, chaotic situations, which in turn could lower the 
security level, increase employees’ work strain, and negatively affect passenger 
satisfaction. 
Passenger density can be defined as the number of passengers present 
simultaneously in one screening lane at one moment. An important precondition for 
measuring passenger density is that there are enough passengers queuing up. That is, 
at least one passenger has to be in a waiting position. The number of passengers 
present simultaneously is calculated as follows: The first passenger to be counted is 
the one who is at the very beginning of the security control process, i.e., the one who 
does the first action (usually touching the baggage tray). The last one to be counted is 
the one who is at the very end of the security control process (usually the one stepping 
away from the control lane). All passengers within this process, for example 
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passengers loading their hand baggage into the tray, passing through the WTMD, 
undergoing a pat-down search, or collecting their belongings, are counted. 
To ensure a certain minimum distance between measurements, a maximal 
sampling frequency of 1/min was defined. Sampling was done visually by two 
observers who were present behind the security control screening lanes. Each of those 
observers sampled data from three security control lanes sequentially, i.e., started at 
lane one and sampled, then moved on to lane two and sampled, then moved on to lane 
three and sampled, then began again with lane one. Like this, a certain number of 
samplings of passenger density per control lane resulted after the measurement 
period. Subsequently, those were averaged into one value of passenger density per 
control lane per measurement period.  
The second efficiency measure was passenger throughput. Throughput is very 
important for different stakeholders, because it is used for capacity calculations and for 
infrastructure and personnel planning. It is also important for ensuring certain minimum 
connecting times for transferring passengers and for the calculation of queuing times 
for security control. If throughput is neglected, “airlines or airports whose security 
screening procedures are particularly time consuming can expect to lose business to 
their competitors” (Gilliam, 1979, p. 117). Throughput is a widely recognized measure 
in the applied field and is used for benchmarking between European airports. We 
propose the following definition and operationalization of passenger throughput: 
Passenger throughput denotes the maximum capacity of a security control lane in 
passengers/hr. 
As it is a measure denoting maximum capacity, it must be ensured that during 
measurement there are more passengers available than the number that the security 
control lane can actually handle. If the number of passengers is lower than the capacity 
of the security control lane, the measure only denotes the number of passengers and is 
not an indicator of maximal capacity. Therefore, measurements must only take place if 
there is a queue of passengers, i.e., at least one passenger queuing up and waiting in 
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front of the lane. Throughput was measured automatically using the relevant function of 
the WTMD’s standard commercial software. As demonstrated in the preliminary study 
(Wetter et al., 2010), the absolute values of data collected automatically by the WTMDs 
in the respective sector at the respective airport are too high by approximately M = 
15.1%, SD = 7.3%3. However, further analyses by the same authors proved that 
automatically collected data can be used very well for analyzing variations over time at 
the same location. This is exactly what they were used for in this study, where absolute 
values are of little importance. 
Goal setting is expected to affect passenger density because it can be 
controlled by the SOs themselves. However, it is unclear if it will also affect throughput. 
Apart from employee behavior, throughput significantly depends on external factors as 
well, such as “number of manual baggage inspections to be done” and “day 
temperature” (Wetter et al., 2010). Throughput was chosen as second measure for 
efficiency because it is known to correlate with passenger density (Wetter et al., 2010) 
and because it is widely used. Both are true crew-level measures – that is, one value 
per crew is generated. Further, the two dependent variables were collected for all 
crews present (population level) in the respective sector during the respective time 
interval. 
In addition to these measured variables, employee self-report measures were 
collected with a questionnaire, which mainly served for assessing goal recall 
performance after the short intervention. The employees were asked the question, 
“Evaluation of the briefing: What goal were you assigned by the supervisor at today’s 
briefing?” Possible answers were “There was no goal assigned” (with a check box) or 
“The following goal was assigned:” (with an empty line for writing in the goal). In this 
way, it was assessed whether SOs thought a goal had been assigned, and if yes, what 
                                            
3
 For instance, SOs passing the WTMD or passengers passing the WTMD twice contribute to 
an overestimation of absolute values for throughput in automatic measurements. 
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they thought the goal had been. In the baseline condition, the questionnaire also 
contained items to assess the representativeness of the work conditions during the 
study as compared to everyday work conditions regarding throughput, security level, 
and friendliness towards passengers. Seven questions about subjective impressions of 
different work aspects were asked in both the baseline and the “do your best” condition 
to compare if the impressions changed along with goal setting. In addition, there were a 
few items concerning the employees’ views on goal attainment in the “do your best” 
condition only. For operational reasons, it was decided to skip this in the “specific 
difficult goal” condition and to have the SOs answer the goal recall question only. 
 
2.2.C Procedure 
Prior to the work shift, the supervisor in charge of the pre-shift briefing in the 
sector was told that staff persons from R&D would be present during the morning peak 
hour. For the “do your best” and the “specific difficult goal” condition, the supervisor 
was given a memo with the goal (see section “Variables”). The supervisor then 
communicated this information to the SOs at the briefing. Some supervisors 
communicated the goal by simply reading out the memo aloud; others communicated 
the goal using their own words. This communication process was not fully standardized 
because it is known that this is exactly what happens in everyday practice: Every 
supervisor communicates new instructions in his own way. Thus, the study was 
devised to provide maximal ecological validity. During the briefing, staff persons from 
R&D were present as passive listeners. After the briefing, SOs opened the assigned 
security control lanes to passengers. As soon as there were enough passengers 
waiting, that is, when there were queues and no more gaps between passengers, 
measurements started. In order to measure passenger density, two people from R&D 
circulated behind the security control lanes, each of them observing three lanes. The 
measurement period for both, passenger density and throughput, stopped as soon as 
there were gaps between passengers approaching the security control lanes instead of 
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continuous queues. Measurements lasted 39 min on average (M = 39.34 min, SD = 
9.42 min). A few minutes afterwards, the questionnaire was administered to the SOs.  
The baseline condition was devised in order to guarantee the same amount of 
observer presence and for recording and measuring passenger density in exactly the 
same way as in the conditions with goal setting. Thus, the procedure of the baseline 
condition was identical to the one described above with the only difference that no 
memo was given to the supervisor, and, as a consequence, no goal setting took place. 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.A Manipulation Check 
The observers always noted during the supervisor’s briefing if the instruction 
from the memo was in fact communicated to the crews, which served as manipulation 
check. This was always the case, thus, the success rate of the manipulation check 
being 100%. 
 
2.3.B Interrater Reliability for Passenger Density 
Interrater reliability for passenger density was established as follows: After 
measurements were finished, both observers4 plus a third person who had not been 
involved in data collection measured the same security control lanes in an additional 
session. Thirty measurements were recorded independently by these three observers, 
and they were subsequently compared applying Pearson correlations. Ratings of the 
two “trained” observers who collected data for the study correlated with r = .94. The 
correlation between the ratings of observer 1 and the “new” observer was r = .92; the 
correlation between observer 2 and the “new” observer was r = .91. 
 
                                            
4
 The first author was one of the observers. 
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2.3.C Efficiency 
Because it makes sense to integrate both, passenger density and throughput, 
into a construct “efficiency”, and because the preliminary study (Wetter et al., 2010) 
had demonstrated that they are correlated with r = .27, a MANOVA was calculated. 
The factor (between) was “Goal” (baseline, “do your best,” “specific difficult goal”). In 
the multivariate analysis, the dependent variable was “efficiency” as a construct. The 
MANOVA revealed a significant effect of “Goal” with F(4, 196) = 5.006, p < .001 and an 
effect size of ηp2 = .093 on efficiency. In order to find out which of the two dependent 
variables contributed to this result, univariate analyses were calculated.  
Univariate tests revealed that “Goal” had a significant effect on passenger 
density with F(2, 98) = 10.971, p < .001 and an effect size of ηp2 = .183. Simple 
contrasts revealed significant differences between all possible comparisons: baseline 
vs. “do your best” with p < .05, “do your best” vs. “specific difficult goal” with p < .05, 
baseline vs. “specific difficult goal” with p < .001 (Figure 1, left). On the other hand, 
there was no significant effect of “Goal” on throughput with F(2, 98) = 0.177, p = .838 
(Figure 1, right). 
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Figure 1. Means and standard deviations for passenger density (left) and throughput 
(right) for the three conditions. 
 
2.3.D Goal Recall 
The questionnaire containing the goal recall question was filled out individually 
by more than 79% of the SOs overall. Figure 2 (see next page) shows the exact 
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numbers for the three conditions. In the baseline condition, the question (“What goal 
was assigned by the supervisor at today’s briefing?”) revealed that SOs had no goals in 
mind: Out of a total of N = 96 individual responses, 56% cited a new regulation that had 
nothing to do with a goal, 24% cited other information that had been communicated in 
the briefing, 19% stated explicitly that no goal had been communicated, and 1% 
reported “do not know.” 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Baseline Do your best Specific difficult goal
%
Condition
Missing
Completed
n = 19 n = 29 n = 32
n = 96 n = 76 n = 138
 
Figure 2. Questionnaire completed and missing for the three conditions. 
 
Since the dependent variables are crew-level measures, answers to the goal 
recall question for the “do your best” and the “specific difficult goal” condition were 
categorized as either “correct” or “wrong” for the whole crew. They were regarded as 
“correct” if at least three out of five crew members stated the correct goal. Otherwise, 
they were regarded as “wrong” for the whole crew. On the individual level, correctness 
of the reported goal was judged conservatively5. Figure 3 (see next page) shows the 
goal recall performance in the “do your best” and the “specific difficult goal” conditions. 
                                            
5
 For example in the “specific difficult goal” condition, the answers “max. 8 passengers” or “work 
fast to ensure good passenger flow” were counted as wrong. The first one is conceptually 
wrong, and the second one has lost its specific, difficult character. 
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Free recall of the goal succeeded significantly more often in the “specific difficult goal” 
condition than in the “do your best” condition, with χ2(1, N = 137) = 26.12, p < .001. 
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Figure 3. Goal recall performance for the “do your best” and “specific difficult goal” 
condition. 
 
2.3.E Subjective Impressions of SOs 
While working in the field, it was discovered that the response format of two 
questionnaire items was wrong and misleading6. After discovery, this was corrected for 
the subsequent day of data collection, and data from questionnaires with the 
misleading format were excluded. Somewhat later, when analyzing questionnaire data, 
it was discovered that two other items were poorly phrased. One item was obsolete, 
and the other one did not make sense7. Due to that, it was decided not to analyze 
                                            
6
 The items “as compared to an average hour of work, the work strain was” and “as compared to 
an average hour of work, my tiredness was” first used the response format “much worse – same 
– much better,” which could not be interpreted and does not make sense. 
7
 The questions, “How clear was the goal assigned by the supervisor?” and “Do you think you 
neglected other aspects of work due to goal setting at the briefing?” were not analyzed. The first 
one is obsolete, because this is tested with the goal recall. The second one does not make 
sense for the “do your best” condition, because this goal is completely unspecific and does not 
focus on any aspect. 
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those two items at all. After these exclusions, the SOs’ ratings from 1 to 5 were 
analyzed (Figure 4). 
Subjective ratings reached average values of M = 3.04 for throughput, M = 3.14 
for security, and M = 3.20 for friendliness towards passengers. As a rating of 3 
represents exactly the middle in our response format, it can be said that baseline 
ratings are very close to the middle. This indicates that during our baseline 
measurements, SOs did not perceive any of the subjective variables to be 
extraordinarily high or low. As we wanted to compare conditions with goal setting to the 
current practice without goal setting, this is an important result in order to demonstrate 
that the baseline condition stands representatively for standard daily operation. 
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Figure 4. Ratings of questionnaire (means and standard deviations) for the baseline 
and “do your best” conditions: the higher the rating, the “higher” the subjective 
impression in the respective aspect. First three questions in baseline condition only, 
last three questions in “do your best” condition only. 
 
Seven items were answered in both the baseline and the “do your best” 
condition. Ratings for these seven items were compared using two-tailed t tests. For 
these pairwise comparisons, a Bonferroni correction (e.g., Abdi, 2007; Bortz, 1999) 
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was applied. Results from all comparisons lack significance (all ps > .060). These 
results show that subjective impressions of several work aspects did not differ 
significantly between the baseline and the “do your best” condition. The three items 
that had only been asked in the “do your best” condition revealed one interesting result: 
Although SOs were of the impression that they had kept the goal in mind reasonably 
well during work (M = 4.09, SD = 1.35), and although they thought they attained it quite 
well (M = 4.82, SD = 0.47), they did not think they worked better with the goal (M = 
1.83, SD = 1.18). 
 
2.4 Discussion 
The results demonstrate that goals for a time span of about 40 min can 
significantly increase crew performance of SOs in terms of efficiency at work. This 
increase in efficiency came about even though there was no feedback and subsequent 
possibility for adjusting behavior. Moreover, the increase in performance was caused 
by minimalistic goal setting by supervisors, i.e., without prior instruction, training, or 
other interventions that cost time or money. It could be replicated that specific, difficult 
goals lead to better performance in the targeted specific aspect than an unspecific “do 
your best” goal. With regard to memory, the specific, difficult goal could be better 
recalled after about 40 min than the “do your best” goal. Contrary to our expectations, 
employees themselves did not perceive their increase in performance. 
In many studies, “do your best” was used as baseline condition (e.g., Latham & 
Baldes, 1975; Locke & Latham, 1990). In the present study, “do your best” could be 
compared to no goal at all, which served as the baseline condition. This was possible, 
because SOs know their task well and work according to their directives. Because it 
lacks an external referent, the “do your best” goal was defined idiosyncratically (Locke 
& Latham, 2002) by the SOs. When SOs tried to “do their best,” passenger density in 
the security control lanes was significantly higher than the baseline performance 
without goal setting. This effect of “do your best” is noteworthy because it did not make 
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SOs focus on any specific aspect of their work. It may therefore be speculated that an 
unspecific “do your best” goal has also beneficial effects on many other aspects and 
variables apart from passenger density. Focusing SOs on passenger density alone by 
using a specific, difficult goal, led to even better performance in this specific aspect. 
This finding of an advantage of a specific, difficult goal as compared to a “do your best” 
goal with regard to the variable addressed is fully in line with earlier research (Locke & 
Latham, 1990, 2002). 
The preliminary study (Wetter et al., 2010) revealed a positive correlation of r = 
.27 between passenger density and throughput. However, that finding was based on a 
small sample size. With the present study, the finding could be replicated (r = .23, p < 
.05) with N = 101. Both results provide strong evidence that passenger density and 
throughput are indeed positively correlated measures of security control efficiency. 
Thus, handling more passengers simultaneously is beneficial to the overall passenger 
flow. We learned from personal communication with SOs that with increasing 
passenger density, perceived stress increases and perceived security decreases. Data 
from the questionnaire, however, hinted at the fact that if SOs do not consciously know 
that passenger density is high, perceived work strain does not change. Of course, the 
absolute number of passenger density is influenced not only by crew performance but 
also by other factors. One of these is the size of the infrastructure or space in general. 
Therefore, the maximal value of the variable passenger density is limited depending on 
infrastructure. It can be speculated that there is an optimal passenger density for each 
layout or size of infrastructure. 
The study revealed no significant effect of goal setting on throughput. There are 
three possible reasons for this lack of significance. First, SOs were told or instructed to 
pay attention to throughput in neither the “do your best” nor in the “specific difficult 
goal” condition. However, they were instructed in the “specific difficult goal” condition to 
care for passenger density. Second, data from throughput have rather large standard 
[2] Efficient and effective goal setting for short interventions in airport security 
43 
deviations, which make it more difficult to find significant effects. Third, throughput is 
significantly influenced by external factors, on which crew members have no influence, 
which is a major difference to passenger density. This limitation can be illustrated by 
the fact that the two external factors “number of manual baggage inspections to be 
done8” and “day temperature” account for 25% and 22% respectively of the variations 
in throughput (Wetter et al., 2010). 
Interrater reliability for measurements of passenger density between the two 
observers was very high. Moreover, measurements with a “new” observer reached 
almost the same reliability values. These results show that measuring passenger 
density using the proposed method is reliable, can be learned quickly, and is little 
prone to distortions. The concept is also very simple in practice and leaves little room 
for interpretation. 
Data from the goal recall question revealed that the specific, difficult goal could 
more easily be recalled after the morning peak hour than the “do your best goal.” We 
suggest that a goal with a specific number can be more easily retained in memory and 
be subsequently recalled than an unspecific goal. Findings from cognitive psychology 
strongly support this idea: Walker and Hulme (1999) showed that concrete words are 
easier to recall than abstract words. Subjective ratings revealed mean values for 
throughput, security, and friendliness that were very close to 3 in the baseline 
condition. Therefore, baseline measurements were very close to the average work 
situation and, thus, representative. The conclusion can be drawn that during baseline 
measurements, there were no extraordinary events that affected the domains in 
question, which is necessary for generalization of the findings of this study. 
Other ratings showed that SOs thought they did not work better with the 
specific, difficult goal. However, objective data clearly point in the opposite direction. 
                                            
8
 For one, the number of manual baggage inspections depends on what kind of items 
passengers carry with them. For another, it is positively influenced by training (Koller, 
Hardmeier, Michel, & Schwaninger, 2008) and the experience (Schwaninger, Hardmeier, & 
Hofer, 2005) of the X-ray screener. 
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This hints at a discrepancy between the subjective evaluation of the goal’s effects and 
the objective results if there is no feedback. In a similar vein, it was found that seven 
ratings about different work aspects did not differ significantly between the baseline 
and the “do your best” condition. This might indicate that indeed both work situations 
were comparable, or – as is more likely if compared with objective measures 
(significantly higher passenger density) – changes in behavior brought about by goal 
setting were not consciously represented in SOs’ minds. It might be speculated that 
people underestimate goals and their effects on behavior. 
A rival hypothesis that might come to mind is that motivational effects caused by 
knowledge of results could have caused the increases in performance. Knowledge of 
results means that learning is facilitated, if participants are informed about the progress 
they are making. In other words, increases in performance might be due to effects of 
(continuous) feedback rather than to goal setting. Translated to our applied situation, 
this could for instance mean that if SOs counted passenger density every now and 
then, this activity alone motivated them to reach higher and higher numbers. Looking at 
our design, effects of knowledge of results can be completely ruled out for the “do your 
best” condition, since it is unspecific. SOs neither knew what to focus on nor did they 
know which variables were measured by the observers. For the “specific difficult goal” 
SOs could observe the number of passengers present simultaneously and therefore 
could gain some knowledge of results. We cannot estimate how often they had time to 
do so and actually did it. Thus, the alternative explanation that knowledge of results 
brought about the increase between the do your best and the specific difficult condition 
cannot be ruled out with our design alone. 
Confronted with the same question, Locke (1967) and Locke, Cartledge, and 
Koeppel (1968) separated effects of knowledge of results and goal setting. They 
showed that effects are due to different levels of motivation produced by the different 
goals and not by knowledge of results. It was further shown that knowledge of results 
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does not appear to affect performance independently of the goals set (Dossett, 
Latham, & Mitchell, 1979). In a similar vein, Locke et al. (1968) stated that the mere 
presence of knowledge of results does not increase performance unless it is used by 
the individual to set a specific hard goal. Erez (1977) showed that feedback actually 
boosts the relationship between goal setting and performance by facilitating the display 
of individual differences in goal setting. 
But what about social facilitation (Zajonc, 1965) or the “Hawthorne Effect” 
(Landsberger, 1958; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939)? In order to prevent those from 
coming into effect in our study, it was ensured that there was exactly the same amount 
of presence of supervisors and observers in all conditions including the baseline. The 
drawback of this is that possible overall reactivity, caused by observer presence, 
cannot be ruled out. However, the presence of observers was necessary in order to 
measure passenger density. 
Locke, Latham, and Erez (1988, p. 23) stated, “if there is no commitment to 
goals, then goal setting does not work.” Similar to that, Latham and Yukl (1975, p. 824) 
stated, “goals that are assigned to a person (e.g., by a supervisor) have an effect on 
behavior only to the degree that they are consciously accepted by the person.” French, 
Kay, and Meyer (1966) pointed out, however, that this relation was only observed when 
employees had a past history of participation. In our study, we used an authoritative 
way of setting goals without participation by supervisors and employees. Regarding 
police and security work, where authoritative goal setting is predominant, it can be 
argued that our setting was ecologically valid. Moreover, Locke and Latham (1990) 
found a correlation of r = .58 between set goals and personal goals. This suggests that 
a significant part of authoritatively set goals will later be accepted and treated as 
personal goals. 
The present study demonstrated that minimalistic goal setting can be used at 
briefings in order to enhance work performance during short interventions. It is easy to 
use, efficient and effective, provided the tenets of goal setting theory are followed. It 
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can thus be recommended to install pre-intervention goal setting as a meaningful 
complement to programs such as “management by objectives”, which focus on longer 
time periods. 
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Abstract – In most work contexts, several performance goals coexist, and conflicts 
between them and trade-offs can occur. Our paper is the first to contrast a dual goal for 
speed and accuracy with a single goal for speed on the same task. The Sternberg 
paradigm (Experiment I, n = 57) and the d2 test (Experiment II, n = 19) were used as 
performance tasks. Speed measures and errors revealed in both experiments that dual 
as well as single goals increase performance by enhancing memory scanning. 
However, the single speed goal triggered a speed-accuracy trade-off, favoring speed 
over accuracy, whereas this was not the case with the dual goal. In difficult trials, dual 
goals slowed down scanning processes again so that errors could be prevented. This 
new finding is particularly relevant for security domains, where both aspects have to be 
managed simultaneously. 
 
                                            
1
 This study is submitted to the Journal of Personnel Psychology. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In many laboratory and field studies, goal setting proved to be an effective and 
efficient tool to enhance performance of the workforce (Locke & Latham, 2002). 
Provided that the preconditions for goal setting are favorable (e.g., moderate task 
complexity, commitment, ability to achieve the task), striving for challenging goals leads 
to an increase in performance of around 0.6 (±0.2) of a standard deviation on average 
(Locke & Latham, 1990). Research further suggests that at least four mediating 
processes underpin the efficacy of goal setting. From the accumulated evidence it 
appears that difficult and specific goals motivate people to: (1) exert more effort (e.g., 
work faster or harder) during task performance, (2) continue working on the task until 
the performance goal is reached (display persistence), (3) direct their attention to 
behavior and outcomes that are relevant for goal attainment (i.e., focus on the task at 
hand), and (4) develop and use appropriate task strategies (i.e., engage in planning; 
see Locke, 2000; Wegge, 2001). 
However, the application of goal setting in daily work life raises a few as yet 
unanswered questions (Locke & Latham, 2006). For example, numerous studies have 
repeatedly demonstrated speed-accuracy trade-offs in performance. If goal setting 
using a single specific difficult goal (e.g., a speed goal) led only to a focusing effect, 
i.e., performance in this one aspect is maximized, while other aspects (e.g., quality) are 
neglected, caution would be necessary in the everyday use of goals. The problem of 
potential speed-accuracy trade-offs due to goal setting is particularly evident in security 
sensitive domains. Imagine that on a very busy day at an airport supervisors of 
Security Officers (SOs) would, subject to pressure from the operational business, set a 
goal for their SOs to “check at least 200 passengers per hour per control lane.” This 
would most certainly lead the SOs to a shift in behavior away from scrutinizing every 
passenger and bag with high caution towards faster work routines. It is highly 
questionable if something like this would be justifiable as security might suffer. 
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In airport security control, several objectives, out of which possible goals can be 
extracted, exist side by side. As Wetter, Lipphardt, and Hofer (2010, p. 301) stated, 
“The ideal security control would be effective, cheap, and would not interfere with the 
operation of the airport.” In other words, SOs should provide security by scrutinizing 
passengers and baggage, do so at a reasonable pace, not creating costly delays of 
flights, and, last but not least, be friendly and helpful to passengers. Thus, the 
coexistence of several goals, which are often not addressed and prioritized explicitly by 
management, can lead to goal conflicts for employees (Schmidt & Dolis, 2009; 
Schmidt, Kleinbeck, & Brockmann, 1984). The question arises how goal setting affects 
these different performance aspects and how unwanted trade-offs could be avoided. 
Our research aims to analyze this problem in detail, comparing the effectiveness of 
dual goals for speed and accuracy to single speed goals on the same task for the first 
time. Moreover, we also seek to identify the underlying stages of information 
processing (e.g., scanning in working memory, decision processes) that are affected by 
single and dual goals in order to gain new insights about the processes that explain the 
impact of goals on speed-accuracy trade-offs. 
 
3.1.A Goal Setting and Human Information Processing 
In view of the very robust performance effects linked to goal setting it can be 
expected that high work motivation induced by setting difficult goals should accelerate 
and modulate many basic processes that are necessarily involved in performing tasks. 
These basic processes might include, for example, the identification and semantic 
classification of new information or the processing of information in working memory 
(Wegge, 2001). Moreover, it can be assumed that influencing these processes is 
achieved through changes of activation or inhibition processes in the neural system. In 
support of this idea, prior studies clearly documented goal setting effects within tasks 
that allow for the identification of these basic processes by a thorough manipulation 
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and analysis of reaction times (Wegge, 1998). For example, it was found that goal 
setting enhances the speed of scanning processes in working memory (e.g., examined 
using the Sternberg task), increases general working memory performance (e.g., 
examined using reading span tests), and also improves the identification and semantic 
classification of simultaneously presented pairs of letters (Wegge & Dibbelt, 2000). In 
addition, the performance enhancing effects of speed goals in studies of this kind could 
not be explained by a simple speed-accuracy trade-off. Even though we know of no 
other experiment in which the effectiveness of dual goals on the same task was 
investigated, based on this firm knowledge we predict: 
Hypothesis 1: Setting difficult speed goals and setting difficult dual goals for 
speed and accuracy lead to an increase in speed. 
 
3.1.B Goal Conflicts 
Striving for multiple goals at the same time is pervasive in the work place, as 
work tasks become more complex over time (Humphrey, Nahrgang, & Morgeson, 
2007) and organizations also tend to reduce costs through downsizing, so that the 
responsibilities of remaining employees are increased. Therefore, research on goal 
setting has also addressed the question of how goals should be formulated in 
situations where employees have to perform more than one task (e.g., Pritchard, 
Harrell, DiazGranados, & Guzman, 2008; Schmidt & Dolis, 2009; Schmidt et al., 1984). 
Based on this research, it can be concluded that striving for multiple or even conflicting 
goals is problematic and often yields performance decrements, in particular on tasks or 
performance aspects that the goal does not explicitly address. One possible 
explanation for the difficulty of realizing all aims at the same time (and the stress 
created by doing so) is the limited overall capacity of cognitive components, such as 
working memory (Hasher & Zacks, 1988) or volition (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). Due to this 
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limited capacity and given the premise of (nearly) full utilization of cognitive resources 
during a difficult task, focusing on one aspect of performance that is stressed in the 
specific performance goal (e.g., speed) must be associated with a decrease of 
performance in another aspect that lies outside the focus (e.g., accuracy). We thus 
predict: 
Hypothesis 2: Setting a single, specific, difficult speed goal triggers a speed-
accuracy trade-off. 
If this assumption is true, the question arises as to how this potentially 
unwanted trade-off could be avoided. One possibility could be setting a dual goal that 
addresses both speed and accuracy at the same time. Performance on controlled 
memory search tasks like the Sternberg task (Sternberg, 1966, 1969, 1975) is strongly 
dependent on load (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). With a dual 
goal, two goals compete for the same pool of cognitive resources. Experiments by 
Wegge (1998) using the Sternberg paradigm showed that the serial comparison stage 
(representing scanning processes) is particularly affected by setting speed goals. 
Based on this knowledge, we predict: 
Hypothesis 3: Setting a dual goal slows down scanning processes in difficult 
trials. 
We will test our hypotheses using two different paradigms: Experiment I applies 
the Sternberg paradigm, and Experiment II applies the d2 test (Brickenkamp, 1962). 
 
3.2 Experiment I 
3.2.A Method 
For Experiment I, the Sternberg task was chosen because it follows the same 
principles as the baggage screening task performed by SOs at an airport or a sports 
stadium. It requires participants to decide if a target stimulus was or was not contained 
in a stimulus set that had been learned previously. Similarly, SOs learn what items are 
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prohibited on an airplane or in the sports stadium. Later, during their daily work, they 
search bags either by hand or by judging scans and decide if one of those learned 
stimuli is present or not. Another example in security is access control, where a person 
seeking entry has to be matched with a previously learned set of persons that are 
granted access. In another domain, namely quality control at an assembly belt, errors 
(deviations from a previously learned pattern) have to be identified. All these jobs have 
furthermore in common that processing time must not be neglected. 
The Sternberg paradigm allows for analysis of different stages of mental 
processing by systematic variation of certain experimental factors (see below). In this 
experiment, participants were presented a set of one-digit numerals (e.g., 4 5 7 9) to be 
memorized as the first stimulus. These numerals were selected by a computer. Display 
duration (in s) was equal to the number of numerals contained. After a certain time 
interval (ca. 1 s) participants were presented a single numeral as the second stimulus 
(e.g., 5). Subsequently, they had to decide if the second stimulus was a part of the 
learned set or not. Participants indicated their response (“yes” or “no”) by pressing one 
of two adjacent keys on a keyboard. Participants were then presented the next set to 
be learned (varied-set procedure). 
Setting and Participants. The setting was devised to maximize 
standardization; it always featured the same room with the same equipment. At the 
beginning of the experiment, the experimenter chose which one of the two keys on the 
keyboard represented the answer “yes.” Participants were instructed to use their left 
index finger for pressing the left key and their right index finger for pressing the right 
key (counterbalanced across conditions). Stimuli were presented on a CRT display. 
The total sample consisted of 83 students at a large European university. After the 
matching of the participants (see below), the data on 57 participants (70.18% men), 
ages 18-37 years (M = 25.21, SD = 3.91), remained for analysis. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
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Experimental Design. We manipulated four independent variables, three of 
which being within-subject factors and one being a between-subjects factor. The first 
within-subjects factor “Block” had two levels, “baseline” and “goal setting.” In the 
baseline block, no goals were assigned to participants. In the goal setting block, 
difficult, specific goals were assigned to all participants except those assigned to the 
control condition. The second within-subjects factor was “Set size,” the number of one-
digit numerals to be learned. This factor had five levels, ranging from set size 2 to set 
size 6. The third within-subjects factor “Response type” had the two levels “yes” and 
“no.” This factor indicated the response given by the participants. Both the second and 
the third factor were included in Sternberg’s (1969) stage model of item recognition. 
According to him, manipulating set size affects serial comparison processes (longer 
RTs for larger set size due to more serial comparisons), whereas manipulating 
response type affects the binary decision process (longer RTs for “no” answers due to 
different decisional process). 
The between-subjects factor “Goal” divided the participants into three groups. 
The first group served as controls. Participants were asked to “do their best” in solving 
the task. In combination with the two blocks, this design allowed us to assess and 
control for learning effects (increase in performance between baseline and goal setting 
block for controls). The second group received a speed goal as the instruction in the 
goal setting block; they were told that the mean RT in the goal setting block should be 
12% lower than in the baseline block. The third group received a speed goal and an 
accuracy goal as the instruction in the goal setting block. This goal stated that the 
mean RT in the goal setting block should be 12% lower than in the baseline block and 
that no more than two additional errors (compared to the baseline) should be made.  
Since numerous studies suggested that goal commitment is a moderator for 
goals to be effective (e.g., Erez & Kanfer, 1983; Latham & Yukl, 1975; Locke, 1968; 
Locke & Latham, 1984), we decided to boost goal commitment in the experiment. 
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According to Locke, Latham, and Erez (1988), external rewards are important 
determinants of commitment. Making use of this knowledge, we informed the 
participants that they would be awarded an equivalent of USD 10.25 for goal 
attainment. 
Dependent variables. The computer recorded reaction times (RTs) and error 
rates. RT is the time span from presentation of the second stimulus (the probe) up to 
the participant’s keystroke. In order to measure the success of the goal commitment 
manipulation, all participants (except controls) filled out a questionnaire comprising 9 
items, using 4-point answering scales ranging from low (1) to high (4). These items 
assessed different antecedents of goal commitment that previous studies identified as 
important (see Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck, & Alge, 1999): the value of goal attainment 
(e.g., “reaching this goal will have pleasant consequences for me”), expectancy of goal 
attainment (e.g., “It is highly likely that I am a little bit better than the goal requires”), 
and volitional strength during goal attainment (“I will stick to the goal, even if I find that 
my feelings are diverting me from this goal”). This commitment scale was found to be 
highly reliable (9 items; Cronbach’s α = .81). 
Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment participants received 
standardized written instructions explaining the Sternberg task and the course of the 
experiment. Participants started by completing a warm-up block (120 trials with 
feedback after every 30 trials) that aimed at familiarizing them with the task. The main 
part of the experiment started with the baseline block, which consisted of 240 trials. 
“Set size” and “Response type” were varied systematically, and presentation order was 
random. After every 30 trials a feedback message showed the mean RT of the last 30 
trials (correct answers only) and the number of errors. In addition, after the baseline 
block a feedback message showed the overall mean RT and the overall number of 
errors of all 240 trials. 
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After the participants completed the baseline block, they were matched and 
assigned to a goal condition by the computer using a predefined algorithm. The first 10 
participants were assigned as controls (“do your best” goal). For all subsequent 
participants, the following matching process was followed: It was checked if the 
participant’s mean RT of the baseline block was comparable (i.e., ±20 ms) to the RT of 
one of the controls. If this was the case, they formed a matched pair, and the second 
participant was assigned the speed goal. If the RT was not comparable (i.e., the 
difference exceeded 20 ms), this participant was assigned as a control. If, in the course 
of the experiment, a third participant’s RT of the baseline block was comparable to the 
RTs of an already matched pair (i.e., ±20 ms with both other participants), this third 
participant was assigned the dual speed and accuracy goal and completed the trio of 
participants. With the help of this yoked design, baseline performance should not differ 
across experimental conditions. Before the start of the next block, participants (except 
controls) completed the questionnaire on goal commitment. The subsequent goal 
setting block was identical to the baseline block with one exception: feedback was 
different. In the goal setting block, only the overall feedback message at the end of the 
block was displayed, showing the overall mean RT for correct answers and the number 
of errors of all 240 trials. In order to compensate for the now missing intermediate 
feedback, a short break was inserted after every 60 trials. 
 
3.2.B Results for Experiment I 
Control Variables: Sex, Age, Commitment. Table 1 (see next page) shows 
the intercorrelations between variables. Male participants were older than female 
participants. There was a positive correlation between age and speed in both the 
baseline and the goal setting blocks, with younger participants being faster. As there 
were no significant differences in the distribution of the participants’ age between the 
three goal conditions (no goal: M = 26.37, SD = 3.29; speed goal: M = 25.74, SD = 
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4.13; speed and accuracy goal: M = 23.53, SD = 3.88) with χ2 (2, N = 57) = 4.57, p = 
.10, this variable was subsequently regarded as evenly distributed between groups. 
The goal commitment scale revealed no difference between the group with the speed 
goal (M = 3.0, SD = 0.5) and the group with the dual speed and accuracy goal (M = 
2.8, SD = 0.5) with t(36) = 1.20, p = .24. These mean values further suggested that 
overall goal commitment was given and constant across goal conditions. 
 
Table 1 
Experiment I: Pearson correlations for age, sex, and performance measures. 
    Baseline Goal setting 
 Age Sex Commitment Speed Accuracy Speed 
Sex2 -.48***      
Commitment .20 -.27     
Speed in baseline block .35** -.25 .15    
Accuracy in baseline block -.12 .16 -.10 -.02   
Speed in goal setting block .34** -.25 -.05 .82*** -.09  
Accuracy in goal setting block -.17 .01 -.07 -.15 .53*** -.30* 
Note. Significant correlations are shown in bold (* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001). 
 
Model Fit. To analyze whether the Sternberg model can be applied to the 
present data, a mixed MANOVA with the between-subjects factor “Goal” (do your best, 
speed, speed and accuracy) and the within-subjects factors “Block” (baseline, goal 
setting), “Response type” (yes, no), and “Set size” (2, 3, 4, 5, 6) on the dependent 
variable RT (ms) was calculated (Tables 2 and 3, see next pages). This MANOVA 
                                            
2
 Male is coded as 0, whereas female is coded as 1. 
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revealed significant main effects of “Block,” “Response type,” and “Set size,” as 
predicted by the Sternberg model. Significant interactions were “Goal x Block,” “Block x 
Set size,” “Response type x Set size,” and “Block x Response type x Set size.” 
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Table 2 
Performance measures Experiment I: means (standard deviations) for RTs in ms, 
above, and errors in %, below. 
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Table 3 
Performance measures Experiment I: Test statistics, significance probabilities, and 
effect sizes. 
 RTs Errors 
Goal F(2, 54) = 0.70, p = .50 F(2, 54) = 1.34, p = .27 
Block F(1, 54) = 140.39, p < .001, η2p = .72 F(1, 54) = 14.00, p < .001, η2p = .21 
Response type F(1, 54) = 27.72, p < .001, η2p = .34 F(1, 54) = 21.99, p < .001, η2p = .29 
Set size F(4, 216) = 198.78, p < .001, η2p = .79 F(4, 216) = 45.37, p < .001, η2p = .46 
Goal x Block F(2, 54) = 6.27, p < .01, η2p = .19 F(2, 54) = 1.79, p = .18 
Goal x Response type F(2, 54) = 1.10, p = .34 F(2, 54) = 2.25, p = .12 
Goal x Set size F(8, 216) = 0.38, p = .93 F(8, 216) = 1.68, p = .11 
Block x Response type F(1, 54) = 1.32, p = .26 F(1, 54) = 0.53, p = .47 
Block x Set size F(4, 216) = 6.06, p < .001, η2p = .10 F(4, 216) = 0.93, p = .45 
Response type x Set size F(4, 216) = 4.58, p < .01, η2p = .08 F(4, 216) = 11.41, p < .001, η2p = .17 
Goal x Block x Response type F(2, 54) = 1.38, p = .26 F(2, 54) = 0.14, p = .87 
Goal x Block x Set size F(8, 216) = 1.79, p = .08 F(8, 216) = 0.55, p = .82 
Goal x Response type x Set size F(8, 216) = 0.55, p = .82 F(8, 216) = 0.41, p = .91 
Block x Response type x Set size F(4, 216) = 6.12, p < .001, η2p = .10 F(4, 216) = 0.63, p = .64 
Goal x Block x Response type x Set size F(8, 216) = 1.59, p = .13 F(8, 216) = 0.69, p = .70 
 
In a similar way, the conformity of the data with the Sternberg model was tested 
for accuracy. A mixed MANOVA with the between-subjects factor “Goal” (do your best, 
speed, speed and accuracy) and the within-subjects factors “Block” (baseline, goal 
setting), “Response type” (yes, no), and “Set size” (2, 3, 4, 5, 6) on the dependent 
variable errors (percent) was calculated (Tables 2, 3). This MANOVA revealed 
significant main effects of “Block,” “Response type,” and “Set size,” as predicted by the 
Sternberg model. There was also a significant interaction “Response type x Set size.” 
A significant interaction “Response type x Set size” means that these factors at 
least partly influence the same stage of information processing. This is contrary to what 
Sternberg (1969) had postulated and found – namely, that the factors are completely 
additive, i.e., independent of each other. This interaction is solely based on RT 
differences between “yes” and “no” answers being larger in easy tasks (set size 2) than 
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in difficult tasks (set size > 23). Even though this implies that in our experiment some 
caution is advised when interpreting the effects of the binary decision stage (“Response 
type”) and the serial comparison stage (“Set size”) on their own, the expected 
independence for other levels of these factors is given. 
Hypothesis Testing. The significant interaction “Goal x Block” in the MANOVA 
on RTs (Tables 2, 3) suggests that goal setting was effective. A closer look at the data 
(Figure 1) and deeper analyses with simple contrasts revealed significant differences in 
the mean RT for no goal vs. speed (t = -3.41, p < .01), and for no goal vs. speed and 
accuracy (t = -2.53, p < .05) but no significant difference for speed vs. speed and 
accuracy (t = -0.88, p = .38). Thus, both goals were effective in reducing RTs and 
Hypothesis 1 is supported by the data. 
400
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No goal
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Figure 1. Effect of “Goal” x “Block” on RTs (means and standard deviations) in 
Experiment I. 
 
Table 1 shows that in the baseline block (N = 57), speed and accuracy were 
uncorrelated (r = -.02, p = .87), whereas in the goal setting block (N = 57), they were 
correlated (r = -.30, p < .05). Subsequently, the data of the goal setting block were 
                                            
3
 I.e., the average of set sizes 3 to 6. 
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analyzed separately for the different goal conditions (each with n = 19). The group with 
the “do your best” goal reached a correlation of r = -.29, the group with the speed goal 
reached a correlation of r = -.41, and the group with the dual goal reached a correlation 
of r = -.14. The correlation is highest for the group with the speed goal but does not 
reach significance (p = .08) due to the relatively low power. It is thus evident that goal 
setting triggered an overall speed-accuracy trade-off, to which the speed goal 
contributed more than the dual goal did. Hypothesis 2 therefore also finds support in 
the data. 
As the above reported results of the MANOVAs are tests averaged across all 
levels of the factors, an in-depth analysis on the factor “Set size” representing scanning 
processes was performed. Simple contrasts for the factor “Goal” and Helmert contrasts 
for the factor “Set size” on RT (ms) were calculated. For the interaction “Goal” x “Block” 
x “Set size” (2 vs. >2), the contrasts indicated a significant difference for speed vs. 
speed and accuracy, with t = 3.02, p < .01 (Table 4, see next page). For the simple 
speed goal, improvements due to goal setting were much higher in difficult sub-tasks 
(set size > 2) than in simple sub-tasks. For the dual goal these differences were no 
longer observable, because scanning is slowed down again in difficult sub-tasks. It can 
be concluded that the dual goal particularly slowed down scanning processes in the 
more difficult trials, thus supporting Hypothesis 3. 
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Table 4 
Experiment I: Interaction Goal x Block x Set size. Means (standard deviations) for RTs 
in ms, above, and errors in %, below. 
 Goal 1: speed goal Goal 2: speed & accuracy goal 
 Baseline Goal setting ∆ 
(GS-BL) 
Baseline Goal 
setting 
∆ 
(GS-BL) 
Set size 2 531 (78) 
3.2 (2.5) 
455 (66) 
6.6 (5.9) 
-76 (44) 
3.4 (5.6) 
541 (100) 
2.9 (2.4) 
456 (47) 
4.7 (4.9) 
-85 (76) 
1.9 (4.4) 
Set size 3 579 (80) 
1.7 (2.2) 
487 (68) 
3.8 (4.2) 
-93 (46) 
2.2 (3.8) 
587 (84) 
1.1 (1.6) 
504 (55) 
3.3 (4.7) 
-83 (47) 
2.2 (4.1) 
Set size 4 632 (103) 
2.4 (2.2) 
513 (74) 
3.7 (3.6) 
-119 (59) 
1.3 (3.3) 
642 (107) 
2.2 (2.8) 
542 (68) 
3.3 (4.3) 
-101 (78) 
1.1 (5.1) 
Set size 5 678 (111) 
2.5 (2.4) 
568 (77) 
4.7 (4.3) 
-110 (62) 
2.2 (3.7) 
674 (111) 
2.6 (2.1) 
589 (77) 
4.2 (4.8) 
-85 (64) 
1.5 (5.4) 
Set size 6 696 (123) 
5.7 (3.7) 
589 (113) 
8.7 (5.3) 
-106 (71) 
2.9 (4.3) 
690 (112) 
6.0 (2.8) 
609 (96) 
7.7 (6.8) 
-80 (70) 
1.7 (6.3) 
Note. Helmert contrasts on RTs (significant results are shown in bold): Set size 2 vs. 
>2: t = 3.02, p < .01; Set size 3 vs. >3: t = 0.99, p = .33; Set size 4 vs. >4: t = 0.53, p = 
.60; Set size 5 vs. 6: t = -0.06, p = .95. 
 
3.2.C Discussion of Experiment I 
By applying the Sternberg paradigm, it could be shown that both single and dual 
goals were effective in increasing speed performance. The single goal was not 
significantly more effective than the dual goal. However, the single specific difficult goal 
triggered a speed-accuracy trade-off, which was less pronounced with the dual goal. 
Our results further showed that the joint optimization of speed performance and 
accuracy performance by dual goals was achieved by slowing scanning processes in 
difficult trials with high cognitive load. The evidence created by Experiment I was 
[3] Can dual goals for speed and accuracy prevent speed-accuracy trade-offs? 
 
67 
gained in a highly controlled setting with one task and a rather homogeneous sample of 
students as participants. In order to investigate if these findings generalize to another 
task and a different sample of participants, Experiment II was devised. 
 
3.3 Experiment II 
3.3.A Method 
For Experiment II, the d2 test was chosen. Whereas the Sternberg task is a 
number memorization task, the d2 is a test of attention consisting of a visual 
discrimination task (targets have to be discriminated from distracters, e.g.,    from    ). 
The d2 task also shares some basic principles with tasks in security. For example, a 
visual ticket check regarding validity date at a checkpoint could be seen as a similar 
task: Holders of valid tickets (targets) have to be efficiently granted access, which has 
to be reliably denied to holders of invalid tickets. Given the usual queues at 
checkpoints and people arriving rather late than early for boarding of the aircraft or the 
sports game, there is considerable time pressure on these checks, which is reflected in 
the concept of the test as well. 
Whereas Experiment I featured a typical student sample, Experiment II featured 
a more heterogeneous sample of participants which is likely to be much more 
representative of the general working population. 19 participants (57.89% female), 
ages 23-61 years (M = 38.16, SD = 15.18) with different educational backgrounds and 
different jobs volunteered. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
The d2 was administered as paper and pencil test. 
Participants were tested three times in a repeated measures design. In order to 
lessen learning and memory effects, a time gap of one month was inserted after each 
test. Thus, the three tests were completed in three months time, with one test per 
month. The first testing served as baseline; participants were told to “do their best.” The 
d2’s speed (total number of symbols processed) and accuracy (total number of errors) 
d˙ dd˙˙
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measures were recorded as dependent variables. For the second testing, participants 
were matched to two groups that did not differ significantly with regard to their baseline 
performance in speed and accuracy (all ps > .82). Before the second testing, 
participants of group 1 were told that they should completely solve every line of the test 
in the given time, whereas participants of group 2 were told that they should not commit 
any errors. This goal manipulation represents a specific difficult goal regarding speed 
(group 1) or accuracy (group 2). The third testing used a dual goal; all participants were 
told that they should completely solve every line of the test in the given time and not 
commit any errors. 
The procedure was as follows: After having arrived, participants were explained 
the d2 task. They were then assigned the goal and, subsequently, solved the test. After 
having solved the test, they were asked by the experimenter to repeat the goal they 
had been assigned. This question served as manipulation check. One participant 
mentioned that the goal had not at all been present in her mind throughout the testing. 
Her results were subsequently excluded. 11 participants (42%) did not complete all 
three tests. The reasons for dropping out before the last testing were lack of motivation 
(9), severe illness (1), and absence (1). 
 
3.3.B Results for Experiment II 
Performance measures are presented in Table 5 (see next page) and visualized 
in Figure 2 (see next but one page). Results from group 1 reveal that speed 
performance (assessed by the number of symbols processed by participants) with the 
specific difficult speed goal was higher than do your best with t(6) = 3.00, p < .05. 
Similarly, speed performance with the dual goal was higher than do your best 
performance with t(4) = 3.84, p < .05. Speed performance with the dual goal appeared 
to be slightly lower than with the speed goal, although this result did not reach 
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significance (p = .08). Thus, both goals were effective in increasing speed of 
performance and Hypothesis 1 is supported again. 
 
Table 5 
Performance Measures Experiment II: means (standard deviations) for symbols 
processed, top, errors, middle, and speed-accuracy correlation. 
 Group 1 
(specific difficult = speed) 
Group 2 
(specific difficult = accuracy) 
Do your best 479 (119) 
38.1 (42.0) 
r = .76 
n = 9 
490 (93) 
42.6 (43.9) 
r = .61 
n = 10 
Specific difficult goal 547 (70) 
27.3 (23.4) 
r = .42 
n = 7 
485 (101) 
17.8 (21.1) 
r = .61 
n = 9 
Dual goal 534 (88) 
17.8 (17.9) 
r = .24 
n = 5 
540 (99) 
18.7 (23.8) 
r = .37 
n = 6 
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Figure 2. Performance measures Experiment II: Means (standard deviations) for 
speed, above, and accuracy, below. 
 
Table 5 shows that for “do your best” and the specific difficult goal conditions, 
speed and accuracy were strongly correlated, indicating that participants paid with 
more errors for being faster (in this task, positive correlations indicate speed-accuracy 
trade-offs). Even though none of these correlations reaches significance due to the low 
power (all ps > .13), these data are in line with Hypothesis 2. With the dual goal, the 
observed speed-accuracy trade-off is again less pronounced. However, due to the low 
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N, this experiment cannot provide conclusive evidence on its own and thus has to be 
interpreted together with Experiment I. 
 
3.4 General Discussion 
By applying the Sternberg paradigm and the d2 test in two experiments with 
different samples, this study shows that both single and dual goals are effective in 
increasing working speed. However, the single specific difficult goal triggered a speed-
accuracy trade-off, which was less pronounced with the dual specific difficult goal. The 
joint optimization of speed and accuracy performance by dual goals was achieved by 
slowing scanning processes in difficult trials. The implications of these findings for 
practical applications in the area of goal setting are manifold, especially in domains 
with multiple objectives or in security sensitive domains where security sometimes has 
to be provided under time pressure. We suggest that a dual goal might be used if 
speed-accuracy trade-offs are to be prevented. This might work best with routine tasks 
with little cognitive load. 
Many studies over the last 50 years demonstrated that single specific difficult 
goals are effective (Locke & Latham, 2002). Based on our results, which revealed a 
speed-accuracy trade-off using this type of goal, we would like to argue that a part of 
this “increase in performance” described in many studies on goal setting is due to a 
loss of performance in another work aspect. Single goals apparently have the effect of 
“guiding” and “focusing” performance and effort on one aspect. According to Shiffrin 
and Schneider (1977), error rates might go up when time pressure is induced, because 
the participants might be forced to terminate the controlled search before it is 
completed. Then, a response would have to be made as a guess, based on partial 
information.  
More important, we are not aware of a previous study that directly contrasted 
the effects of a single goal to a dual goal on task performance. By doing so, we found 
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that the dual goal was effective in reducing RTs as well, with a slightly less pronounced 
side-effect of triggering a speed-accuracy trade-off. When task difficulty and the 
resulting cognitive load were high, scanning processes were slowed down. In their 
research on the effects of dual goals on self-regulation and resource allocation, 
Schmidt and Dolis (2009) suggested that the cumulative demands placed by multiple 
difficult goals may exceed individuals’ perceived capabilities and may lead to partial or 
total abandonment of one goal to ensure attainment of the other. Linking these ideas 
with our results on scanning processes, we would like to argue that there are two 
possible processes that can explain these results: (1) Individuals can consciously 
assign lower importance to one goal, which might ultimately lead them to give it up 
entirely, or (2) they can keep following both goals consciously, but unconscious 
cognitive processes (e.g., scanning processes) that are affected by goal setting and 
task demands limit the outcome in one goal area. 
Attempting to achieve speed and attempting to achieve accuracy can be seen 
as two things that interfere with each other, competing for a general limited capacity 
(Kahneman, 1973; Moray, 1967). In Kahneman’s (1973) words, “it is easy to focus 
attention exclusively on a single object and difficult to divide attention among several 
objects” (p. 7). In addition, it is known that controlled search tasks like the Sternberg 
task are limited-capacity processes that require attention and are thus strongly 
dependent on load (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). By 
allocating capacity to two different aspects – namely, speed and accuracy, the dual 
goal actually divided the available capacity. Our research thus supports the conclusion 
by Schmidt et al. (1984) that goals control the allocation policies for the resources 
invested.  
Our results further hint at the importance of task characteristics (which 
determine task difficulty) in relation to the limited capacity for the actual task 
performance, if more than just one aspect is taken into account (e.g., speed and 
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accuracy). Thus, in our view, a general assumption of “something’s got to give” in a 
dual goal (or even dual task) situation is wrong, because the occurrence of trade-offs 
depends on the relation between task demands and available capacity. It can be 
assumed that available capacity can change (e.g., during the day). Schmidt, Kleinbeck, 
and Knauth (1988) have demonstrated that setting goals that are adapted to the human 
circadian rhythm can indeed contribute to an optimal distribution of work units and rest 
periods in the real work situation. In that study, this optimization of allocation policies 
lowered subjective strain of employees. 
To integrate findings, it could be said that single goals can have the 
disadvantage of inducing trade-offs. The advantages of single goals are that they are 
well known, easy to use (also with difficult tasks), and the most effective. Dual goals, 
on the other hand, seem to slightly reduce trade-offs but are somewhat more 
complicated to use and understand and are a little less effective than single goals. At 
present there is not much knowledge available on dual goals. What type of goal should 
be used ideally depends largely on the overall job characteristics (e.g., if there is one 
aspect that must not be neglected at all) but also on task difficulty (e.g., routine vs. non-
routine task). 
It was not possible to conduct this study in the field because performance in 
security areas cannot be compromised. Therefore, no final conclusion can yet be 
drawn about the effects of dual goals in the everyday setting in security. As a next step 
in order to pave the way for applications in security sensitive domains, we suggest a 
simulator study (e.g., using X-Ray Tutor, Schwaninger, 2003, 2004). Thus, real stimulus 
material (e.g., x-ray images with and without prohibited items) could be used to get 
closer to reality and to see if the effects can be replicated. In particular, it should be 
tested to what extent dual goals have the potential to reduce trade-offs. If trade-offs can 
be minimized with dual-goals, a first pilot test in the real work situation could be 
ventured. On conducting this pilot test, it would be necessary to find ways of reliably 
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measuring performance of employees in different aspects. It should further be taken 
great care to ensure as much experimental control as possible and to rule out as many 
confounds as possible. We also suggest that the dual goal should contain one 
component about security, so that it can be ensured that employees keep this crucial 
aspect in focus as well. 
In most work environments, several goals exist side by side, so it is of high 
practical relevance to find ways of dealing optimally with this situation. Apart from 
defining key performance indicators and deriving goals, the goals themselves and the 
tasks to be performed have to be analyzed regarding their difficulty and capacity 
demands. If there are several goals to strive for at the same time or several tasks to 
work on concurrently, they should be integrated into a system. Tasks and goals should 
be prioritized and minimally acceptable values of key performance indicators defined. 
This would give employees a clearly defined system of how to work in their complex 
environment without being overwhelmed by different goals, demands, and tasks. 
Coming from a different starting point, Schmidt and Dolis (2009) reached the same 
conclusion – namely, that a system that promotes communication and coordination of 
goals may help to avoid overloading or underloading of employees. A system of this 
kind can be set up by applying ProMES (Pritchard, 1990), for example, which is an 
approach that seeks to support group members in solving these problems (Wegge et 
al., 2010). As Wetter, Fuhrmann, Lipphardt, and Hofer (2011) showed in a pioneering 
study at the security control of a large European airport, this can be a fruitful approach 
in security domains, where many stakeholders are involved and performance in certain 
aspects must not be compromised. 
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Abstract – Ensuring smooth operation of an airport is a complex task with many 
stakeholders involved that have to work together closely in order to achieve optimal 
results. In particular, the field of security control harbors diverging interests of different 
entities that share responsibility for secure and timely flights. These entities usually 
comprise governmental organizations (e.g., legislative authorities, police) and private 
companies (e.g., airport operators, private security companies). Due to conflicting 
interests between these entities, managers might perceive each other as adversaries 
rather than as partners for collaboration. 
To our knowledge, the present report is the first one to relate procedure and 
results of a fruitful collaboration on management level between representatives of 
these different entities at an airport, including a governmental organization as the 
executive, i.e., carrying out the security control, and a private company (the airport 
operator). In the setting of the security control at a large European airport, the 
Productivity Measurement and Enhancement System (ProMES) methodology [1] was 
                                            
1
 This study was published 2011 in M. Faundez-Zanuy, V. Espinosa-Duró, & L. D. Sanson 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 45th Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (pp. 20-25). 
Mataró, Spain: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 
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chosen to identify stakeholders in the security control process as a first step in order to 
be able to define their interests, demands, and needs in a second step. Subsequently, 
justified demands were grouped and categorized into six goal domains. For each goal 
domain, key performance indicators were developed. Last but not least, the indicators 
were prioritized by weighing their relevance against each other in order to resolve 
conflicting interests. This process can be rather quick and efficient provided it is well 
prepared and monitored. It is further suggested to have an independent facilitator 
supervise and moderate the process. 
This study highlights the importance of bringing together high level managers of 
different organizational entities with a systematical approach in order to pave the way 
for good cooperation in complex work domains. As a result, stakeholders and demands 
can be identified, conflicting demands can be discussed, and priorities set. 
Subsequently, those guidelines can be handed over to the next lower level in the 
organizational hierarchy. Supervisors on this next level can then define goals for their 
respective domains using the guidelines provided by the management. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Offering passengers safe, secure, comfortable, and timely flights is a complex 
service, which demands for highly professional management. In order to offer travelers 
the best possible service, an airport has to rely on many interdependent stakeholders. 
Following the passengers’ way from arrival at the airport to take-off, this becomes 
evident. The passengers have to arrive on time at check-in, which requires public and 
private transport to the airport to be fluid. Waiting-times at check-in should be within the 
expected range so that the necessary information and baggage can be processed in 
time. Ground handling companies have to ensure that baggage is loaded onto the 
airplane after it was checked by the police or a private security company. The 
passengers themselves have to find their way to the gate as conveniently as possible. 
One point of particular importance is the security control, which can become a 
bottleneck in this chain, as all bags and passengers have to pass it. The ideal security 
control would be effective, cheap, and would not interfere with the operation of the 
airport [2]. Security control is a process that can be regarded as an excellent example 
showing the existing interdependencies at an airport. Security control itself is 
dependent on passengers. If they inform themselves prior to the flight about current 
regulations, arrive on time, and if they cooperate well with Security Officers (SOs), the 
process will most certainly be quick and without any difficulty. Security control also 
depends on the airport as a provider of facilities and services. One example for that is 
that passenger throughput differs between different docks of the same airport even 
when using the same security equipment [2]. Furthermore, security control also 
depends on the regulatory framework that can differ from country to country. 
On the other side passengers, the airport, and the airlines are highly dependent 
on security and services provided by the security control. In a recent survey with 1315 
travelers at 12 major U.S. airports [3], 79% of the passengers said that privacy is 
important or very important to them. 61% stated that security was even more important 
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to them than privacy. As a third factor, efficiency seems to be important as well: 65% 
said they would choose a screening procedure other than scans or pat-downs if it 
caused a delay of only 1min vs. only 21% who said they would accept 5min delay and 
9% who would accept 10min delay. Moreover, if security control does not operate 
smoothly, no airplane will leave the airport on time. Finally, the airport would like the 
security control to spread the appearance of the airport as a nice and customer-friendly 
place in which travelers are welcome and looked after. 
These interdependencies and different interests can create tensions or an 
atmosphere of being adversaries rather than collaborators, although at the end of the 
day, the final goal of all stakeholders is the same, namely, secure, safe, comfortable 
and timely flights. In order to either prevent tensions from occurring or to reduce them 
in case they have already occurred, it is necessary to set up a systematic way of 
collaboration, offering consideration to all stakeholders. All parties involved can thus 
realize that it is necessary to create solutions together and help each other implement 
them. A first fruitful approach that yielded deeper insights into the security control 
process, carried out in close collaboration of an airport and a security control operator, 
was reported last year [2]. 
In order to foster a common management-level approach to security control, the 
ProMES methodology was chosen. The purpose of this paper is to document this 
collaboration on management-level between security control by an airport and a 
security control operator. Knowledge gained shall be shared, and ProMES be 
presented as a method for successfully setting up a productivity and performance 
measurement and management system in security domains. 
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4.2 Method 
4.2.A Setting and stakeholders 
The present study was carried out at a large European airport that serves as an 
airline hub. Two main stakeholders were involved in the project, namely, the airport 
operator, which is a privatized company of which the state still holds a share, and the 
airport police, a division of the state police. The branches involved from the airport 
operator were Airport Operation, responsible for smooth operation of flights, Airport 
Security, responsible for the airport’s compliance with security standards, and Planning 
and Engineering, responsible for infrastructure. From the police side, the security 
control branch was involved, which is responsible for carrying out security control. All 
stakeholders assigned high-level management representatives for setting the ground 
for the ProMES system. 
 
4.2.B Four ProMES workshops 
In four workshops, each lasting about 4 hrs, plus 30 min of individual computer-
based data collection, the management representatives set up a ProMES system 
referring to management level. This process was guided and supervised by an 
independent facilitator (the second author), assisted by the police’s research & 
development unit (the first and the last author). Setting up a ProMES system basically 
consists of identifying objectives, identifying valid indicators that measure how well 
objectives are achieved, defining contingency functions that link indicator values to 
effectiveness, and setting up a system of regular measurement and feedback [1]. 
The main reasons for choosing ProMES were that the parties involved wanted 
to use a standardized and evaluated approach for identifying the different stakeholders’ 
needs and interests, create key performance indicators, weigh their effectiveness 
against each other in order to resolve conflicts of interest, set up a framework of 
measurement, and implement regular measurement and feedback processes. The 
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main goal of the whole project was to enhance performance and productivity, as well 
as employee participation and satisfaction. Starting this process on management level 
aimed at creating clear guidelines for the next lower levels in the hierarchy, so that 
these supervisors would then clearly know which goal domains the management level 
considers as highly important. These insights could later on be implemented in 
subsequent ProMES systems on these lower organizational levels. 
 
4.3 Procedure 
4.3.A Workshop I: Customers, objectives, goal domains 
In the first workshop, different groups of customers for the security control were 
identified, and their demands and expectations listed. Subsequently, a consensus was 
reached about which of those demands were regarded as justified. Next, other 
objectives and activities reflecting the airport’s key interests were added. Those 
objectives and justified demands were matched with groups of customers and 
duplications removed. The resulting objectives (n = 21) were grouped and arranged 
into meaningful goal domains with regard to content. These goal domains were 
illustrated using a mind map [4]. The results were then checked again to ensure 
completeness. In order to do so, the four perspectives from the Balanced Scorecard 
were applied: financial, customer, internal-business-process, as well as learning and 
growth perspective [5, 6]. The participating managers were asked to check if every 
perspective was contained in the collection of objectives and that none was lacking. 
For each of the four perspectives, objectives were contained. 
 
4.3.B Workshop II: Measurement, key performance indicators 
The main objective of the second workshop was to discuss and identify possible 
ways of measurement for the goal domains that had been defined in the first workshop. 
Each manager investigated possible operationalizations for one goal domain. 
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Managers presented their findings during the workshop. Subsequently, the most 
suitable indicators for each goal domain were chosen by consensus as key 
performance indicators. 
 
4.3.C Workshop III: Ranges of indicators’ levels 
The third workshop mainly served to define the possible ranges of the 
indicators’ levels. For each indicator, three values were agreed on by the management. 
They represented the lowest possible value, a neutral (“normal”) value, and the best 
possible value. All values were chosen in a way that they were perceived as at the 
same time realistic and achievable by the whole group. While doing so, all indicators 
were scrutinized once more, leading again to some minor changes in the system of 
indicators. 
 
4.3.D Workshop IV: Contingency functions 
Contingency functions were developed using two different methodological 
approaches that are independent of each other. First, during the workshop, priorities of 
the indicators were defined for benefits (positive achievements) and harm (negative 
achievements) separately. Like this, two ranking lists were produced reflecting 
managers’ consensus. Subsequently, each indicator’s contribution to organizational 
performance was expressed as effectiveness score, showing its value for the overall 
organization. The indicator with the highest rank was set to 100 points and the 
indicators with the lower ranks were graded in relation to this value. 
Second, managers were asked to attend a computer session, during which they 
individually answered 50 random paired comparisons of levels of indicators. Applying 
conjoint analysis [7, 8] using the commercially available software Alasca [9, 10], the 
indicators’ usefulness for organizational performance was estimated. Conjoint analyses 
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were calculated separately for airport (n = 4) and police managers (the last author 
being one of them) (n = 3), as well as averaged across all participants (n = 7). 
In a last step, for each indicator, the contingency function that resulted from 
discussion was compared to the three contingency functions (airport managers, police 
managers, overall average) that resulted from the computer-based estimation. 
Differences were discussed, findings integrated, and last adjustments made to the 
contingency functions. Then, all participants agreed on the modified contingency 
functions by consensus. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.A Criteria and objectives 
Fig. 1 shows the six goal domains and the 21 objectives that managers had 
agreed upon by consensus. Note that in this illustration, there is no hierarchy implied. 
Security control Productivity
Security
Employee attitude 
and behavior
Employee needs
Appearance
Customer 
satisfaction
C. friendliness
Perceived security
Handling: efficient, 
pleasant, 
nonrestrictive, well-
informed
Segmentation: 
crews, VIPs, priority 
PAX
Low security costs
Short queuing times
Compliance with 
regulations
Good results in 
tests
Quick adaptation to 
changes
Optimization of 
security
Commitment to airport
Commitment to police
Culture fairness
Nonviolence
Further 
development
Respectful 
treatment
Participation
Health
Satisfaction
Attractive, modern 
infrastracture
Positive image of 
security control
Fig. 1: Goal domains and objectives identified by the management. 
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4.4.B Key performance indicators 
Table I 
Key performance indicators. 
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Table I (see previous page) lists the six goal domains and their 11 respective 
indicators as well as their operationalizations. Note that, again, there is no hierarchy 
implied by the indicators’ numbering. The hierarchy of the indicators is expressed 
solely by the contingency functions (see last paragraph of this section). The indicators 
shall be analyzed in reports that always cover a period of 3 months. 
Goal domain 1, customer satisfaction, shall be measured with two indicators. 
The first one is the average value of 4 questions of a questionnaire. These are part of a 
yearly customer service survey carried out by an independent airport service 
benchmarking company. The second one is the sum of the written customer complaints 
about SOs’ behavior. Seasonal differences (e.g., more families or passengers less 
familiar with the security control process are travelling during summer compared with 
other seasons) are known to be one external factor influencing security control [2]. In 
order to account for that, the sum of complaints is calculated in a rolling way, i.e., it is 
always calculated over the last 12 months and analyzed every third month for the 
ProMES framework. This procedure was adopted for all indicators that are measured in 
a rolling way (see below). 
The discussion of goal domain 2, productivity, revealed that the common 
productivity indicators (e.g., throughput) reflect overall performance on a high and 
aggregated level. They are useful to managers, but the single employee has only a 
very limited influence on them and, therefore, might as well not be too interested in 
these data. It was decided that productivity shall be measured with three indicators: the 
first one reflects the ratio between revenue and expense. It denominates how many 
working minutes of employees are necessary to check one passenger. This value is 
calculated by the Airport Operation Manager by dividing the needed personnel hours 
by the number of local departing passengers of the respective time span. This value 
shall be calculated over the last 12 months (rolling). The second indicator, throughput, 
has been introduced by earlier research [2, 11]. In the present case, it is planned that 
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data on throughput of peak hours (mean) and a clearly defined selection of control 
lanes only shall be analyzed. Analyses shall always contain data of the last 12 months 
(rolling). The third indicator, flight delays, consists of the sum of delayed flights 
(attributed to or caused by security control), divided by the total number of departing 
flights. 
Goal domain 3, security, shall be measured with two indicators. The first one is 
an average of the ratings reached in internal inspections and covert tests carried out by 
the airport operator. The second one is an average of some selected results of the civil 
aviation authority’s biannual screener certification for SOs and from threat image 
projection [12]. This value shall be calculated over the last 12 months (rolling). 
Goal domain 4, employee attitude and behavior, is measured with one indicator 
that consists of 10 questions in total. These ten questions are made up of 5 items 
selected from the affective commitment scale (OCA) [13], translated to German by the 
authors. Each of those five items is asked twice, once regarding the police as direct 
employer of SOs and once regarding the airport as work environment.  
Goal domain 5, employee needs, is measured with two indicators. The first one 
represents employee work satisfaction. It is measured using the general satisfaction 
subscale of the German version of the Job Diagnostic Survey (JDS) [14, 15], which 
consists of five items. Indicators 4.1 and 5.1 will be measured all three months by 
sending a questionnaire to a quarter of the workforce. Like this, every employee is 
invited once per year to complete a questionnaire. This questionnaire will feature the 
10 questions of indicator 4.1 and the 5 questions of indicator 5.1. In addition to that, 
employees can provide reasons for their answers in an open format below the 
questionnaire items. Although this information is not rated in the ProMES system, it will 
be a crucial help in order to discover reasons if employee commitment and satisfaction 
increase or decrease. The second indicator of goal domain 5 is the so-called time-lost-
index, which is the average number of hours that an employee is absent from work. 
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This is calculated by dividing the total number of work absence hours by the number of 
employees. 
Goal domain 6, appearance, describes the appearance and the image of the 
security control, as seen by travelers and / or airport staff. It shall be measured with 
one indicator, which will consist of the average rating out of a certain number of 
questions that are still to be developed to this end. Interviews with travelers and / or 
airport staff shall be conducted by the airport operator. 
The contingency functions for each of these 11 indicators are regarded 
sensitive information by the airport and are not further specified in this paper. For 
benefits (positive achievements), there are two most important indicators that share 
first priority. For harm (negative achievements), there is one indicator that is regarded 
to bear the most negative potential. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
The present study shows that it is possible to set up a ProMES system for 
security control on management level with reasonable investments of time and money. 
By agreeing upon contingency functions, existing goal conflicts can be addressed and 
discussed rationally on the basis of facts and numbers instead of personal opinions or 
subjective role interpretations. To be successful, it is necessary to involve all relevant 
stakeholders in order to develop the system. Because stakeholders have different 
interests, it can be helpful to have an independent facilitator supervise and moderate 
the process. Of course, this strongly depends on the work culture and the philosophy at 
the respective airport. This person should be well-experienced with ProMES, as the 
field of airport security and operation is rather complex due to the multitude of 
stakeholders, different interests, and interdependencies. 
The seven participating managers each spent a total of 16.5 h for setting up the 
ProMES system on management level. In the whole developmental process, 
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participants perceived discussion and exchange of different opinions as fair and 
constructive. This was probably due to the fact-based and consensus-oriented way of 
discussion provided by the ProMES methodology. On the interaction and atmospheric 
side of the project, the approach chosen led to only few incidents where different 
(conflicting) interests were being negotiated and to far more occasions where interests 
could be aligned, common goals for the managerial board be expressed, and methods 
for problem solving be applied. This resulted in broad acceptance of the solutions or 
decisions generated in each developmental step. 
In both organizations, airport operator and police, there was one person who 
organized and prepared meetings and served as point of contact between entities and 
the independent facilitator. The first author did so for the police, the third author for the 
airport operator. The money invested consists of the independent facilitator's salary 
only as well as some minor expenses for professionalizing existing or developing new 
data collection tools. 
The present application of ProMES in a security relevant domain is not the first 
one. ProMES has already been applied successfully at a Swedish traffic police unit 
[16]. However, the complexity of the situation at the airport had at first raised some 
concerns about the feasibility of such a project. The present study demonstrates that 
ProMES can successfully be installed on management level in security control. The 
resulting key performance indicators and the contingency functions are a useful tool to 
comprehensively monitor performance on a standardized and regular basis. Before that 
can happen, though, the exact properties of measurement have to be defined and 
reliability of measurement instruments checked. Data collection and analyses then 
have to be set up in practice, at times causing organizational effort. 
From a theoretical perspective, it is obvious that a good performance indicator 
not only has to be reliable, but also valid and measured in a standardized way. This 
implies that, whenever possible, the viability of indicators should be critically 
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questioned from time to time. After having set up a ProMES system with its respective 
indicators for the first time, reliability and validity analyses should be calculated as soon 
as enough data are available in order to optimize the system’s practicability. 
On setting up such a comprehensive measurement system for the first time, for 
some indicators, no data might be available (as it was the case for some indicators 
described above) so that the contingency functions have to be estimated based on 
theoretically presumed neutral, maximal and minimal values. As soon as enough data 
are available, the estimated contingency functions should be reassessed with the 
question in mind whether the functions are realistic or have to be adjusted. After having 
optimized and reassessed the contingency functions based on existing data where 
necessary, the functions should then be reconsidered in a further step with regard to 
each indicator’s contribution to productivity. Indicators with a very flat slope (i.e., only 
marginal positive and negative impact on productivity) should be scrutinized critically, 
because such indicators do not contribute significantly to the overall performance of an 
organization. It has to be decided if they shall still remain in the system as key 
performance indicators, or if they are merely just performance indicators that are of 
lesser importance and need not be part of the system. Therefore, besides rather 
measurement-related considerations, the indicators should also be evaluated with 
regard to content. 
However, ProMES is far more than just an instrument for measurement. A clear 
advantage of ProMES and its contingency functions is the fact that the importance or 
priority of each indicator is visually evident and therefore existing conflicts become 
apparent. By periodic measurement, trends and developments can be tracked and 
underlying reasons identified. Once those reasons are worked out, the company can 
install measures to either support those changes if they are positive, or to take 
countermeasures if they are negative. What is important, however, is that the 
organization as such can learn from the measurements and the visible trends. Because 
[4] Bringing adversaries together 
 
93 
discussions between different stakeholders thereby are evidence and fact-based, 
constructive argumentation and the derivation of action plans that all participants feel 
committed to are fostered. 
In order to achieve best possible effects in that direction, it is important that not 
only managers, but also employees know the basic principles of ProMES and have 
regular feedback sessions during which they can discuss results and decide on 
changes to be made. Managers agreed that there are some indicators that do not 
make sense to SOs because they are measured on a level of high abstraction and 
aggregation that has very little to do with their daily work. In this case, it is useful to let 
employees set up their own subsequent ProMES system within the six criteria defined 
by the management. They can thus find their own indicators which they can influence 
and sufficiently control in their daily work. This process might be more time and cost 
intensive than the first step that involved management level only. Nevertheless, we 
think that it is of crucial importance, at least in our case, to reach supervisors and SOs. 
The managers agreed that, by doing so, they want to foster participation and 
empowerment among employees. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that the 
employees themselves have a great influence on the quality of the final service that is 
offered to passengers. 
Given the abundance of earlier studies on applications of ProMES, as well as 
the results of our study in a complex, security sensitive domain, we conclude that 
ProMES can be recommended as a methodology to set up a system for performance 
measurement and enhancement. We encourage international collaboration as well as 
exchange of ideas and experiences in this domain. 
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5 General discussion 
5.1 Further implications of the three studies 
As many tasks in security are routine tasks coupled with a very low base rate of 
incidents, change is usually very much welcomed by employees. A frequently applied 
countermeasure against boredom in routine tasks is job rotation (e.g., Jorgensen, 
Davis, Kotowski, Aedla, & Dunning, 2005; Ortega, 2001; Schultz & Schultz, 2010). For 
tasks that do not require highly specialized knowledge, this is possible and could be 
advised. Some tasks, however, consist of highly specialized activities that make an 
interchange of functions much less practicable. For instance, a highly specialized task 
such as the screening of hold baggage can only be fulfilled by a group of specifically 
trained and certified SOs. They cannot be replaced on the spot by any other security 
personnel. 
In these cases, it might be particularly fruitful to work with daily goals. Daily 
goals have the potential to provide some different views or foci on an identical task. 
The first study has demonstrated that goal setting can indeed be used in a similar way 
by supervisors in the everyday work setting at an airport’s security control. These 
supervisors have had no prior experience with the use of daily goals. Moreover, they 
have not received any training in goal setting and communication. Nevertheless, 
positive effects could be found. However, in the long-run the use of this technique 
might present a challenge for supervisors. Having good, meaningful, and sensible daily 
goals ready over a longer period of time without too much repetition could be 
challenging indeed. Here, the supervisors' imagination, situational knowledge about 
what could be important on a certain day, as well as their in-depth knowledge of the 
possibilities of and variations on the task are required. 
The first study analyzed the application of single goals in order to improve work 
performance in one particular aspect. In practice, though, requirements for employees 
are often more complex. For example, the open question of whether providing security 
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and high throughput contradict each other has been of high practical relevance for 
many years. In science, this problem can be described as a classical speed-accuracy 
trade-off. The second study has given a first answer to that question. However, the 
answer is not a clear-cut "yes" or "no" because the occurrence of a trade-off depends 
on several conditions. The two most important ones are the individual employee's 
resources and capabilities, as well as the task's demands. It seems to be the balance 
between those two that determines whether a speed-accuracy trade-off occurs or not. 
The second study further analyzed whether two concurrent demands can be tackled by 
a dual goal, and if, by doing so, speed-accuracy trade-offs can be minimized. The 
result is promising and suggests that dual goals could also find their way into everyday 
practice in some particular situations. Moreover, the need for further research in the 
domain of multiple goals and their implications on work performance has been 
demonstrated. 
The third study provided an overall framework for goal setting at a security 
control. It identified the main organizational objectives, defined key performance 
indicators accordingly, and developed operationalizations for measurement. With the 
present ProMES system, it can be assessed in which domain investments should be 
most useful to the organization. Moreover, the contents of this ProMES system can be 
communicated to the next lower level in the organizational hierarchy. Like this, 
transparency on expectations from management level to supervisor level can be 
achieved. As soon as supervisors know which goals are considered important by the 
management, and how the management prioritizes the different goal domains, they can 
tune their daily work accordingly. Using goal setting during their daily work, they have 
an influence on the optimization of the resources in their own sphere of action. If 
desired, supervisors could also set up their own ProMES system that is linked to that of 
the management, but that features other indicators which are modeled according to 
their own duties. Like this, a “nested” ProMES system could be developed that fits 
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logically into the ProMES system of the management representatives. Thus, a holistic 
system of goal setting using the ProMES methodology could be set up in an 
organization, which would be highly recommended as a next step. 
Setting up a ProMES system with employees that are unfamiliar with the 
approach is also a challenge regarding communication. Talking about performance and 
performance measurement can very quickly be perceived by employees as something 
dangerous. Indeed, one can imagine that ruthless management representatives could 
set up such a system in order to exploit employees. Particularly in combination with 
very low base pay and financial penalties for employees that are below expectations, 
such a measurement system can pose a threat to employees. Employees will react to 
this in a certain way, which might include having a narrow focus that neglects non-goal 
areas, a rise in unethical behavior, distorted risk preferences, and reduced intrinsic 
motivation, which could lead to corrosion of the organizational culture (Ordóñez, 
Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009a). The pointing out of these potentially 
dangerous effects of goal setting by the above authors has started a controversy. 
Locke and Latham (2009) replied to the article mentioned above, which again triggered 
another reply by Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, and Bazerman, (2009b). 
However, Klaus-Helmut Schmidt (personal communication, May 28, 2010) 
stressed that participation, empowerment, and motivation are the key concepts behind 
ProMES, which could be described as some sort of underlying “philosophy” to the 
method. He mentioned that ProMES projects where this had been neglected usually 
turned out unsuccessful. One key idea of ProMES is that individuals and teams 
optimize themselves by analyzing performance feedback and the underlying causes for 
performance that is better or worse than expected. Subsequently, they take action and 
can evaluate the success of the measures taken in the next performance feedback 
report. Optimizing team performance is about employees helping and supporting each 
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other and thus optimizing “from within”. Getting better as a team and subsequent 
appraisal and recognition by supervisors is motivating. 
ProMES can also serve as a platform for developing team spirit. It can be 
expected that teams with high cohesion, mutual trust and support show Organizational 
Citizenship Behavior (Organ, 1988, 1997) towards the other team members and 
towards the organization. Thus, not only the employees, but also the organization as a 
whole benefits from a ProMES system that is set up in a sensible way and that is 
accepted by the employees. This requires managers with a high degree of 
responsibility, mutual trust between the different levels of the hierarchy inside the 
organization, and a system of performance measurement, management, and appraisal 
that is clever, sensible, and socially acceptable. To convince employees that this is the 
plan and to motivate them to participate in setting up the ProMES system is a great 
deal of work and requires good communication skills and strategies. 
 
5.2 Outlook into the future of airport security research 
The general introduction has aimed at familiarizing the reader with the rise and 
development of psychological issues in airport security research. The main body of this 
thesis, consisting of the three studies, has introduced methods and principles from 
work and organizational psychology into the field of airport security. As has been 
demonstrated, airport security was subjected again and again to severe changes, 
which have usually been triggered by terrorist attacks. As the airline business in 
general and airport security in particular are subject to quick changes, this field is 
particularly interesting but also challenging for researchers. There is no point in doing 
research on certain conditions that might have changed unrecognizably before the data 
of the study are analyzed and the manuscript is written. Given the quick-paced nature 
of this business, many more developments can be expected to occur during the next 
years. 
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5.2.A Innovation domain I: technology 
The first domain where such developments could take place is technology. 
Improvements in technology can be of different nature and on different levels: At the 
research level, scientists can develop completely new technologies (e.g., Pulsed Fast 
Neutron Analysis or Thermal Neutron Analysis for detecting items that are not allowed 
aboard an aircraft, see Seidenstat, 2009) that can subsequently be implemented by the 
security industry. At the regulator level (in Switzerland, this is the FOCA1), performance 
standards for devices to fulfill for approval can be made more stringent. At the 
manufacturer level, currently available and implemented technology can be further 
improved and upgraded. Already existing technologies that are not yet deployed (e.g., 
security scanners2 in Switzerland), could further be improved together with researchers 
so that they reach readiness for deployment. At the operator level, airports, police, and 
private security companies can invest into better devices that offer performance above 
the minimal standards. 
For all new equipment, rigorous testing is necessary. It has to be made sure 
that devices fulfill the performance standard prescribed by the regulator (type 
approval). Moreover, continuous functional checks during everyday use have to prove 
that the device is still operating with unimpaired performance. For type approval, but 
especially for later procurement of devices by airports, operational tests are of utmost 
importance. The objective of operational testing is to reveal the impact of a new device 
on operational issues such as required operator training, acceptance by passengers, 
space and maintenance requirements, integration into existing processes, and 
processing speed. 
 
                                            
1
 The FOCA (Federal Office of Civil Aviation) is “responsible for monitoring civil aviation in 
Switzerland and aviation development. It is responsible for ensuring that civil aviation in 
Switzerland has a high safety standard and one that it is in keeping with sustainable 
development” (FOCA, 2011). 
2
 “Security Scanners” (also known as “body scanners”) are devices that are used to check if 
items are carried on the body or in garments that are not allowed in the cabin of the aircraft. 
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5.2.B Innovation domain II: human factors 
The second domain where developments could take place is the human factors 
issues. One way of improvement lies in the optimization of existing concepts and 
procedures. In pre-employment assessment, reliable and valid assessment centers, 
taking into account all of the duties of SOs (not just x-ray screening) could be 
developed. In practice, approaches exist already, but they have to be evaluated, 
improved, and published. In training, syllabi have to be continuously updated and 
improved. For example, correct operation of a new device as well as subsequent 
interpretation of results and alarm resolution have to be learned and practiced by SOs 
so that they are fit for work and ready for taking correct actions in case of an incident. 
Improvement and updating can refer to the contents of the training as well as to 
methods of and media used for teaching. 
Regarding evaluation and performance measurement of SOs, many 
approaches have been described in this thesis (e.g., TIP, throughput, passenger 
density, covert tests). Today, each approach has certain shortcomings that could be 
improved. For fields where no approach exists up to present, new ways of performance 
measurement could be developed and introduced. In the broad field of leadership, the 
work has just begun with the studies of this thesis. In practice, the findings about goal 
setting have to be taught to new supervisors so they can make use of the available 
knowledge during their everyday work. In parallel, further knowledge about leadership 
issues in security has to be gained. 
A domain that is receiving growing attention is the study of suspicious behavior. 
It is believed that cognitive and emotional clues, facial expressions, and behavioral-
impression management clues (Frank, Maccario, & Govindaraju, 2009) could be used 
to identify suspicious persons before they commit a crime. Bättig, Frey, and Hofer 
(2011) carried out a study that showed that recognition of thieves by studying their 
behavior prior to the theft is possible. They revealed that policemen were significantly 
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better at early identification of thieves than laymen. It can be expected that the findings 
of this study about theft can be used as a starting point for later generalization to early 
identification of terrorists. If terrorists or individuals with malicious intents could be 
spotted reliably, this would theoretically allow for an alleviation of the stringent security 
control measures for “normal” passengers. 
 
5.2.C Innovation domain III: organizational systems and responsibilities 
Many airline representatives call for a risk-based approach for shaping the 
future of security control. They claim that risk assessment (Dillingham, 2003) allows for 
a grouping of passengers or baggage into several categories that shall be checked in 
different depth; an approach that would save costs (e.g., Nie, 2011; Nie, Batta, Drury, & 
Lin, 2009). Some of the crucial properties of this approach, however, remain unclear: 
Up to the present, it is not known if risk assessment allows for a reliable selection of 
passengers or baggage that pose high or low threat risk. Moreover, this procedure is 
highly questionable from an ethical point of view. An ethical question that is certainly 
raised if this approach is applied to passengers is how much it complies with 
nondiscrimination and equal treatment of human beings. A related approach that is 
probably more fruitful is randomization. Randomizing certain security checks is a good 
measure for preventing adversaries observing and exploiting patterns and processes of 
checks (Pita et al., 2009). 
Another hot topic that is likely to receive growing attention in the future is the 
insider threat. This term refers to people within an organization that disclose 
confidential information (espionage), intentionally misuse systems, or commit 
sabotage. Most research on this topic was done in information technology (e.g., Moore, 
Cappelli, & Trzeciak, 2008). As the world’s dependency on information technology is 
steadily increasing, this topic becomes more and more important. In the security 
domain, information technology is just as present as in any other branch of the 
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economy. Therefore, it can be expected that the insider threat will become an important 
topic of security research in the future. 
A variety of human and organizational factors might decrease the likelihood of 
occurrence (threat risk) of as well as the vulnerability for an insider attack. As Felix 
Walz, head of the staff branch of the airport police of Kantonspolizei Zürich stated, well-
trained supervisors with a keen perception, who interact frequently with their 
subordinates, should be able to feel when something changes or is wrong in one of 
their subordinates (personal communication, August 2010). A good organizational 
climate with mutual respect, support, and care is also likely to contribute to a low 
incidence of insider crime in an organization. Moreover, good conditions of employment 
and work (e.g., decent salaries, acceptable working times, healthy working conditions) 
might further reduce the likelihood of insider attacks. However, the above facts are 
mere speculations and will have to be the subject of future studies. 
Some legal and political issues, for example the question of which entity is in 
charge of security control, are also regarded as an influence on the provided quality 
level of a security control: In the United States, prior to the 9/11 attacks, private security 
companies had been carrying out security control, whereas after 9/11, this 
responsibility was taken over by the government (Kirk, 2003) in order to establish a 
higher level of security (Seidenstat, 2009). In most European countries, security control 
at airports is still carried out by private security companies, whereas at Zurich Airport, 
the police (Kantonspolizei Zürich) are mandated by law (Kanton Zürich, 2008) to carry 
out security control. Whether privatization is to be favored or not depends on viewpoint: 
Airport-related authors in general rather favor privatization (e.g., Mew, 2005) because it 
offers more flexibility and lower costs, whereas other sources state that federal 
authorities are doing the job rather well (e.g., Gkritza, Niemeier, & Mannering, 2006; 
Seidenstat, 2009). 
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5.2.D Innovation domain IV: interdisciplinary approaches 
Although discussed separately above, technology and human factors should 
also be studied with interdisciplinary approaches regarding their interplay. Traditional 
fields in that domain are ergonomics and human-machine-interaction. Operational 
testing of equipment, as described above, is basically one of the purest forms of 
analyzing human-machine-interaction. By doing so, the strengths, weaknesses, and 
the performance output of the human-machine-system as a whole are measured. The 
holistic view and analysis provided by operational testing in the field is without doubt 
closest to the real performance output that can be expected in everyday use. Recently, 
the focus has broadened even more as sociologists and ethicists have entered the 
area. Ethics cover not only human-machine-interaction, but even add the society with 
its norms to the picture. Up to the present, ethicists have been particularly active in 
studying the impact of security scanners on society (e.g., Nagenborg, 2011; Traut, 
Nagenborg, Rampp, & Ammicht Quinn, 2010). 
 
5.2.E Funding and the “embedded” approach 
In the early days, funding for security research in Europe was scarce since 
applied research and development cannot compete with basic research for federal or 
state funding. An often heard argument was that the economy should pay for advances 
in that domain. In some cases, this had indeed happened, although the economy 
basically only invests money if there are good chances for a return on investment. In 
other cases, it was possible to get mandated by the regulator (e.g., for developing 
certification tests for x-ray screeners). Recently, the recognition by some governments 
and the public, as well as the importance attributed to applied research and 
development has increased. As a result, there are now several state funding programs 
for security research in Europe (e.g., by the European Union, the German Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research, and, as of 2012, the FOCA). 
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Of course, funding is a necessary precondition for fruitful research. However, in 
the security domain, projects funded in this way have met with mixed success until 
now. Some might have yielded scientifically interesting results, but have not added 
much practical value nor led to many improvements in security. The problem is often 
that researchers at universities are physically separated from practical problems, and 
may therefore focus on issues peripheral to the problems encountered during daily 
operation of security control. Moreover, they usually have highly restricted access to 
security sensitive information or to security personnel, which would enable them to test 
new concepts. If research on security sensitive information can be done, it is usually 
done by state labs and cannot be published, which is of course not very attractive to 
researchers. With our new approach of research and development that is embedded in 
police structures, many of these problems can be avoided (although different ones 
might come up). It is our goal to contribute to shaping the future of security research by 
providing what others cannot provide and by fostering interdisciplinary approaches and 
collaboration between established and prestigious academic research and the real-life 
setting of airport security control. 
 
5.3 A discussion of the necessity of a psychological security theory 
In the General Introduction (chapter 1.1), a historical overview of the 
developments in airport security research was given. The three studies of this thesis 
can be seen as a continuation of this line of research (chapter 1.3). On taking this 
knowledge into account, it becomes evident that all the developments up to the present 
consisted of applications of existing psychological theories, concepts, and methods in 
the newly opened field of airport security. All of the underlying psychological theories 
(see chapter 1.4) are general psychological theories that do not focus on security in 
particular. 
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I would like to argue that the field of airport security has not yet been able to 
exert a large and significant impact on the body of psychological theories. Until now, 
the main value of the studies in airport security to psychology as an academic subject 
consisted of the practical insights provided: A deeper understanding of processes, 
requirements, and practices in security has been reached. The study of airport security 
has also been a helpful and interesting new field for (re-)testing and application of 
existing psychological theories, approaches, and management systems. By doing so, 
contributions to existing theory and broadening of the available psychological 
knowledge came almost as a byproduct and were not of large impact. 
There are two possible reasons for this lack of contribution of studies in airport 
security to the body of psychological theories until now: The first reason might be that 
the subject is simply still too young to have made a significant theoretical contribution. 
If a new subject is opened, its properties and mechanisms have first to be studied and 
understood by its researchers. They have to become familiar with the nature of their 
new subject before they can condense their knowledge into new theories. If that should 
be the case with airport security research, new theories that significantly contribute to 
psychology as an academic subject can be expected in the future. The second reason 
might be that airport security research is basically not able to contribute significantly at 
all. It appears possible that no new theories are necessary for psychological aspects in 
airport security. In that case, the field might stay interesting nevertheless for applied 
research that helps practitioners improving current processes and applications. The 
academic interest in the subject, however, might decrease over time given that case. 
These thoughts lead us inevitably to the question under which circumstances it 
would be necessary, useful, and fruitful to create a new theory for psychological 
aspects in airport security, and in which cases this could be deemed unnecessary. In 
my view, a new theory would be beneficial in three cases: (1) if it explained phenomena 
in airport security in a more precise and detailed way than the available psychological 
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theories, (2) if it explained phenomena in airport security in a simpler way than the 
available psychological theories (e.g., if some things worked differently in airport 
security than in other fields, many exceptions and additional statements might have to 
be added to existing theories in order for them to remain valid), and (3) if it explained 
properties and relations between properties in order to predict outcomes that are not at 
all covered by existing psychological theories. 
In his much celebrated lecture “truth, rationality, and the growth of scientific 
knowledge”, Popper (1963) formulated six types of cases in any of which a new theory 
might be seen as closer to the actual facts than an earlier theory. A comparison of my 
three statements of the previous paragraph to Popper’s ideas reveals some parallels. I 
perceive his first case, that a new theory would be fruitful if it made more precise 
assertions that should stand up to more precise tests, to be of identical notion as my 
first statement. His second case, that a new theory would be fruitful if it explained more 
facts, can be seen as corresponding with my third statement. His third case, that a new 
theory would be fruitful if it explained facts in more detail, can be seen as included in 
my first statement. 
Popper’s fourth case, that a new theory would be fruitful if it passed tests that 
the available theory has failed to pass, is without doubt important to science in general. 
For practitioners working in the field, it might seem to be of lesser importance, though. 
Practitioners’ most important goal is usually to apply knowledge to the field, whereas 
improvements over existing psychological theories (a new theory passing tests that an 
old one has failed) are probably no major concerns, as long as the old theories remain 
valid and useful. Of course, every new theory has to be tested for validity and should, 
in general, have some advantages over the old one. Popper’s fifth case, that a new 
theory would be fruitful if it suggested new experimental tests, as well as his sixth case, 
that a new theory would be fruitful if it unified or connected hitherto unrelated problems, 
might be useful for both practitioners and scientists. The fifth case might suggest that a 
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new theory could bring about new (i.e., better or more precise) ways of measurement, 
whereas the sixth case hints at the possibility that by combining problems or parts of 
existing theories, fruitful results can be obtained. 
In political science, security theories exist already. They usually refer to the 
overall security processes going on in nations, internationally, and globally (e.g., Booth, 
2007; Haftendorn, 1991; Tang, 2004). These theories are on the highest hierarchical 
levels as states already feature an extremely high degree of process aggregation. 
Security issues at the state level are the outcome of an integration of security issues of 
all the subordinate hierarchies (e.g., the individual behavior of the people living in this 
state, the behavior of the groups, the teams in organizations, the organizations as a 
whole, the political parties, systemic aspects in politics, law, society, etc.). Security 
theories in political science are without doubt interesting for a study of the behavior of 
states, several states, international organizations, and the global world regarding 
security issues. In other words, security is defined in these theories as a rather global 
concept. In contrast, a psychological security theory would probably be set on a lower 
hierarchical level. It could target human (i.e., individual, dyad, group, and 
organizational) behavior in the security domain. Thus, it would in particular allow for a 
more fine-grained analysis and description of the aspects in security that are caused, 
shaped, or influenced by humans. 
In the same lecture, Popper (1963) further stated that the development of new 
theories is actually the driving force of science. New theories and the critical 
examination of their predictions drive the development of new experiments and 
observations, which can in turn lead to interesting discoveries. He further hinted at the 
fact that science starts from problems, and not from observations. Thus, a careful 
scrutiny of the existing problems in airport security, the analysis of the properties 
involved in the problems, and an idea about how they relate to each other might 
eventually lead researchers in airport security to construct a theory that solves one or 
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several existing problems. By deriving new techniques or interventions from the new 
theory, some problems might also be solved in practice. 
Up to the present, some problems are identified and known to practitioners and 
scientists. Scientific knowledge has contributed to several single solutions that have 
proved effective and efficient. However, an overall framework has not yet been 
developed. By making use of the embedded applied research and development 
paradigm, researchers might be able to set up theories that, by providing an overall 
framework for human factor aspects in airport security, contribute to psychology as a 
scientific subject and the improvement in practical security alike. In my opinion, this will 
be one of the major future challenges in airport security research. 
However, progress takes place in small steps; with every solution to a problem, 
new problems or at least questions arise. In my view, this is particularly evident in 
airport security research. Scientists have addressed many problems, and solutions 
have been implemented in practice. However, terrorists could be described as some 
sort of “intuitive researchers”, who, like their adversaries on the “good” side, will always 
establish new theories and activities, too. Terrorists strive, at least unconsciously, for 
broadening their understanding of security systems. It can be assumed that they 
develop subjective and maybe “naive” theories about weaknesses of the security 
processes and how those can be exploited. Like this, the “good” and the “bad” forces 
could be seen as opposing poles that drive the spiral of research and development in 
airport security. Unfortunately, in many cases in the history of airport security, the “bad” 
forces were on the leading edge and the “good” forces rather answering the challenges 
posed by their adversaries. It is time for making a step ahead. 
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